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INTRODUCTIOH
 
The purpose of this Master's Project was to analyze plea
 
bargaining. In the analysis journal articles and books written
 
between the years 1956 to 1990 were reviewed. The analysis
 
covered readings from historical writers such as Sudnow,
 
Blumberg, and Newman to more recent authors such as Casper,
 
Feeley, and Heumann.
 
One of the primary goals of this project was to find ways in
 
which the court system could operate more efficiently. Reading
 
plea bargaining material from various perspectives gives a good
 
insight into how plea bargaining began. The review also shows
 
the different areas that plea bargaining was used for and shows
 
how plea bargaining affected criminal justice courtroom
 
workgroups. The analysis covers articles and books which examine
 
the perspectives of the prosecutor, judge, public defender,
 
police, and the defendant. Several of the articles reviewed
 
served as comparative material about plea bargaining procedures
 
used in the United States. In fact, as Baldwin & McConville and
 
Felstiner have found, plea bargaining occurs in other countries
 
other than the United States. Although the practice may have
 
another name, plea bargaining nonetheless occurs.
 
Another goal in this project was to examine ways in which
 
the criminal justice system could operate without plea
 
bargaining, and the implications of such a procedure. But, as
 
Rosett and Cressey discuss in JUSTICE BY CONSENT (1976), it
 
appears that plea bargaining is here to stay. Rosett and Cressey
 
argue that plea bargaining occurs often. They also note that
 
most citizens have had some experience with the guilty plea from
 
appearing in court in response to a traffic ticket, for example.
 
In such a case, it appears easier to citizens to plead guilty,
 
pay a fine and go home rather than pleading not guilty because
 
another visit to the courthouse would be necessary.
 
The journal articles, book analyses, and abstracts are not
 
in any specific order of importance. It was decided to put the
 
analysis and abstracts in chronological order. In conclusion,
 
this review will allow the reader to examine the process of plea
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bargaining in the court, and the impact of plea bargaining on the
 
other components of the criminal justice system.
 
PLEADING GUILTY FOR CONSIDERATIONS.- A STUDY OF BARGAIN JUSTICE
 
DONALD J. NEWMAN
 
1956
 
One of the major problems faced by social scientists in
 
studying criminal behavior involved obtaining samples of
 
offenders to be used as units of research. Ordinarily, such
 
samples are drawn from those who have already been convicted and
 
who are or have been previously incarcerated. Such samples
 
usually arise because it is difficult to study those who have not
 
yet been caught, charged, and convicted.
 
Newman's article discusses plea bargaining as a gross misuse
 
of justice which is used by criminals, political officials, and
 
the business elite to avoid a conviction. In his study, Newman
 
interviewed a sample of men who were all convicted of
 
"conventional" felonies in one court district in regard to the
 
process involved in their own convictions. These 97 men came
 
from a "medium" size county where felony convictions would
 
normally follow a quasi-automatic "combat" theory of criminal
 
justice involving a jury trial or at least an unconditional plea
 
of guilty. In studying these convictions, 93.8 percent were not
 
convictions in a combative, trial-by-jury sense, but merely
 
involved sentencing after a plea of guilty had been entered. It
 
is important to note that 38.1 percent of the men had originally
 
entered a not guilty plea, changing to guilty only at a later
 
procedural stage of an actual trial.
 
An interesting difference between those who pled not guilty
 
and those who pled guilty arose. For instance, men entering an
 
initial plea of not guilty were significantly more often
 
represented by defense attorneys than the men who immediately
 
pled guilty. The men with the lawyers (52.6%) when first
 
apprehended often pled not guilty and later changed to guilty
 
pleas. The fact that the retention of counsel correlated with a
 
change of plea to guilty might mean that the lawyers, having a
 
better grasp of the legal worth of the evidence against their
 
clients, advised them to plead guilty and that the clients
 
followed their advice. Another indicator of why offenders would
 
change their pleas would be that attorneys had arranged with the
 
district attorney satisfactory charges or more lenient sentences
 
then originally expected by the offenders. In most cases, these
 
offenders were first time offenders.
 
The second group; those who pled guilty without counsel were
 
offenders, in most cases, who had some prior experiences with the
 
criminal justice system. These recidivists hoped (by pleading
 
guilty) that their cases would expediently go through the
 
conviction process. These recidivists were both conviction wise
 
and conviction susceptible in the dual sense that they knew of
 
the possibility of bargaining a guilty plea for a light sentence
 
and at the same time were vulnerable, because of their records,
 
to threats of the prosecutor to "throw the book" at them unless
 
they confessed. A more general fear, however, was that the judge
 
would be especially severe in sentencing if they did decide to
 
fight and then lost.
 
The considerations received by the offender in exchange for
 
their guilty pleas were of four general typesi
 
1. Bargaining concerning the charge. A plea of guilty was
 
entered by the offenders in exchange for a reduction of the
 
charge from one alleged in the complaint.
 
2. Bargaining concerning the sentence. A plea of guilty was
 
entered by the offenders in exchange for a promise of leniency in
 
sentencing.
 
3. Bargain for concurrent charges. A guilty plea exchange for
 
the concurrent pressing of multiple charges.
 
4. Bargain for dropped charges. Involved an agreement on the
 
part of the prosecutor not to press formally one or more charges
 
against the offender if he in turn pled guilty to the major
 
offense.
 
In instances where informal methods were used the roles of the
 
various participants were cooperative rather than combative.
 
That is, defendants and their counsel participated with the
 
prosecutor's position rather than demanding a trial.
 
In concluding his article, the most significant general
 
finding of the study was that the majority of the felony
 
convictions in the district studied were not the result of the
 
formal, combative theory of criminal law involving in effect a
 
legal battle between prosecution and defense, but were compromise
 
convictions, and the result of bargaining between defense and
 
prosecution. Instead of proceeding through all the formal stages
 
of conviction such as a hearing before a magistrate, preliminary
 
hearing, arraignment etc., the majority of the offenders waived
 
most of these procedures partly due to the informal promises of
 
leniency or threat of long sentences. Hence, they entered guilty
 
pleas.
 
In reviewing the 1iterature, Donald Newman's study of plea
 
bargaining is considered to be a classic piece of research. His
 
findings help to portray many of the injustices which occurred in
 
1956. Further, Newman discusses an issue of whether plea
 
bargaining is legal; that is, whether people convicted as the
 
result of bargaining are convicted by due process of law.
 
THE PRACTICE OF LAW AS CONFIDENCE GAMEi ORGANIZATIONAL
 
COOPTATION OF A PROFESSION
 
ABRAHAM S. BLUMBERG
 
1966
 
Blumberg gives a brief description of three landmark
 
decisions which impacted criminal law procedures and enforcement
 
in the United States of America. The first is Gideon v.
 
Wainwriqht {1963) which required states and localities to furnish
 
counsel in the case of indigent persons charged with a felony.
 
In Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), an important issue arose as to
 
when or at what point in time is a suspect entitled to counsel.
 
In Escobedo v. Illinois. the US Supreme Court held that counsel
 
was to be permitted (either retained or appointed) when the
 
process of police investigations shifts from merely investigatory
 
to that of accusatory. The third case presented by Blumberg is
 
Miranda v. Arizona (1966). In this case, counsel is to be
 
permitted prior to police interrogations as required by the 5th
 
Amendment.
 
The purpose of Blumberg's article is to furnish preliminary
 
evidence of the role of a counselor and to see if such a role
 
deals with social reality. Blumberg states that the overwhelming
 
majority of convictions in criminal cases are not the product of
 
a combative, trial-by-jury process but rather a sentencing of the
 
individual after a negotiated, bargained-for plea of guilty has
 
been entered. In fact, when an accused person goes to his
 
lawyer, the lawyer seems to merely help the accused redefine his
 
situation and restructure his perceptions in accordance with a
 
guilty plea. Hence, the defense attorneys, whether privately
 
retained or a public defender, are ultimately concerned with
 
strategies which tend to lead to a plea of guilty.
 
Blumberg also mentioned that of all the occupational roles
 
in the court, the only private individual who is officially
 
recognized as having a special status and concomitant obligation
 
is the defense lawyer. He has a duty to his client as well as to
 
the court, "Regular" lawyers are those who work on a day-to-day
 
basis who constantly handle case workloads. Intolerably large
 
caseloads of defendants produce intense pressures to process
 
large numbers of cases, hence, lawyers usually convince their
 
clients to plead guilty as a way to reduce such pressures. In
 
all reality, much plea bargaining occurs.
 
Blumberg discusses the key issue of understanding the role
 
of a defense lawyer as it pertains to the process of fixing the
 
fee to be charged and how such a fee is to be collected.
 
Blumberg introduces the "confidence game" which is played. For
 
instance, a lawyer will not represent a defendant unless his
 
services are paid for prior to going to court. Lawyers often
 
contact the defendant's next of kin in order to get their money.
 
Since a typical felony case which results in merely a guilty plea
 
ranges anywhere from $500 to $1,500, many family members are
 
known to contribute to the lawyer's fee. Blumberg also mentions
 
that the courtroom work group assists the lawyer in getting his
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fee by putting on a "performance" so as to make it seem as if the
 
lawyer is really working. Further, judges are known to keep
 
defendants "locked up" a little longer or until a defense lawyer
 
is paid for his services.
 
Blumberg mentions that criminal law operates in a
 
bureaucratic, assembly-line fashion. Defendants are processed in
 
an assembly-line fashion so as to relieve the attorneys of the
 
case workload which involve much pressure. In fact, a good
 
defense lawyer will be able to persuade the defendant's family to
 
help him/her persuade the defendant to plead guilty.
 
In conclusion, Blumberg mentions, in his article, the three
 
major functions which a defense lawyer must serve. They are 1)
 
the lawyer must arrange for his fee; 2) the lawyer must prepare
 
and then, if necessary, "cool off" his client in case of defeat;
 
3) he/she must satisfy the court organization that he/she has
 
performed adequately in the process of negotiating the plea
 
(according to due process procedures) so as to preclude any sort
 
of embarrassing-outside scrutiny.
 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE; THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE
 
JONATHAN D. CASPER
 
1972
 
In the introduction of his book, Casper states that he is
 
examining the criminal justice process from the perspective of
 
the defendant because a defendant is perhaps the most important
 
"consumer" of criminal justice. Casper argues that it is the
 
defendant who must most directly live with the consequences of
 
the administration of criminal justice. Hence, it is the
 
defendant's past and future behavior that is of concern not only
 
to him but also to society at large. Casper argues that to
 
examine what the defendant thinks is happening to him, the roots
 
of his behavior, and the lessons he learns from his encounter
 
with criminal justice is of importance in understanding the
 
operation and impact of one set of institutions of American
 
government.
 
In conducting his research, Casper interviewed seventy-one
 
defendants who were interviewed for periods averaging about an
 
hour and a half. All men interviewed had been charged with
 
felonies in Connecticut. Forty-nine of the men were incarcerated
 
in Connecticut Correctional Institutions; of the remaining
 
twenty-two, sixteen were on probation, and six had received
 
dismissals or acquittals. The men in prison were selected
 
randomly. The men on the street were a self-selected sample.
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The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim.
 
Since the sample of men came from only one jurisdiction,
 
generalizing from this group to all of American criminal justice
 
can be very risky, according to Casper.
 
In another section of the book, Casper argues that though
 
defendants are human beings, they are not treated as such. The
 
majority of defendants are treated as if they are outsiders in
 
American life. In fact, the application of the criminal sanction
 
is perhaps the most serious and destructive measure that the
 
government can take against a citizen. In Casper's opinion, the
 
character of the administration of justice is a crucial indicator
 
of the "justness" of the government and of the quality of life in
 
a society regulated by law.
 
Casper argues that defendant's are also treated in an
 
"assembly line" fashion. In his words, "The system is a machine
 
which begins with raw material consisting of those arrested"
 
(Casper, 1972, pg. 2). Further, Casper argues that defendants
 
are processed and emerge as a product. The convicted criminal is
 
sentenced to prison or released on probation. Between arrest and
 
disposition there are a series of points on the assembly line x
 
the preliminary hearing, the stay in jail awaiting trial, the
 
bargaining about a "deal", the cop-out, and sentencing day.
 
Casper further argues that the machine has some quality controls,
 
and some of the objects are "rejected" and thrown off the
 
assembly line at various stages, as charges are dropped,
 
witnesses do not show up, and imperfections in the state's case
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emerge. Hence, the reality of the system varies from perspective
 
to perspective.
 
In one of the interviews Casper talked to a thirty-three
 
year old man convicted of manslaughter. In the interview, the
 
defendant discusses the process which he encountered from the
 
point of arrest to the point of his sentencing. This man had no
 
prior record and had one year of college education. He was not
 
typical of most defendants which were interviewed. The defendant
 
stated, like most other defendants, that he felt that the police
 
were just doing their job when they arrested him. The police are
 
also seen as adversaries in a game of cops and criminals.
 
Further, according to other interviews, police are seen as
 
performing the valued task of providing order and protecting life
 
and property. When the defendant convicted of manslaughter was
 
arrested, he felt very nervous and uncomfortable because he
 
thought that the police were going to harass and hurt him. From
 
his expectations (based on media coverage episodes), the
 
defendant was surprised that the arresting officers were not
 
physically brutal to him while arresting him
 
After arrest, the defendant stated that he willingly
 
confessed everything that he had done, even after being
 
Mirandized. Though the defendant knew he was entitled to a
 
lawyer, he felt, in a sense, responsible for what he had done.
 
When he finally received a public defender, he had already made
 
several recorded statements about the facts of the crime. When
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put in jail, the defendant describes the unsatisfactory living
 
conditions in the jail.
 
The defendant convicted of manslaughter describes his
 
relationship with his public defender. He states that he had
 
been in jail two and one-half months before he finally got
 
someone who was to represent his case. When the public defender
 
worked on his case, the defendant was left out of any decision
 
making processes which concerned his life. The public defender
 
met with the defendant two months after being assigned to the
 
case and once more before the preliminary hearing. The defendant
 
and his defender met the day before the defendant was to enter a
 
plea. The charges went from first to second degree murder to
 
that of manslaughter without the defendant's knowledge. In fact,
 
the defendant wanted to discuss the issue of going to trial with
 
his public defender, but the public defender never took the time
 
to meet with his client to discuss the issue.
 
In another area of the book, Casper argues that arrest and
 
the placing of charges against a defendant are but the first
 
episodes in the defendant's journey through the legal system.
 
Immediately after the filing of charges, bond is set for
 
defendants not charged with capital crimes. If a defendant
 
cannot post bond, he remains incarcerated until the end of trial,
 
sentencing, or upon release. While in jail, defendants complain
 
of the conditions which are substantially more unpleasant and
 
demeaning than those afforded to convicted criminals. After a
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preliminary hearing, most defendants' cases are disposed of by
 
the entering of a guilty plea.
 
In Casper's view, most defendants avoid the backbone of our
 
system of justice--the trial. In fact, the lack of trials
 
reduces the significance of the procedural guarantees that our
 
system putatively offers to defendants. In particular cases,
 
this may mean that people who are not "legally" guilty, ie whose
 
guilt cannot be proven given the constraints imposed on police,
 
are in fact convicted with their own tacit or explicit consent.
 
With the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof on the
 
state, and with plea bargaining, the defendant is not presumed
 
innocent but guilty. Defendants feel that they must prove their
 
innocence and since doing so may seem difficult, they would
 
rather just plead guilty instead of going through the trial.
 
According to Casper, after the defendant has been arrested,
 
arraigned, and bond has been set, the stage is set for the
 
crucial activity of the criminal justice system: plea
 
bargaining. In fact, plea bargaining is, in many ways, a game.
 
There are at least two, perhaps three, "sides" of the game (or
 
opponents) and each possesses resources and goals. The outcome
 
of any case depends largely upon the vigor and skill with which
 
each side exploits its resources. In general, if a defendant has
 
a privately retained attorney, the attorney is perceived by the
 
defendant as being on his side. If a public defender is
 
involved, the public defender is viewed by the defendant as being
 
a member of the prosecutor's team.
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In reality, defendants view the criminal justice process as
 
being a game; a game that they, as defendants, cannot "win." To
 
some extent, the defendant's ability to play depends upon the
 
prosecutor's willingness to bargain. The prosecutor holds most
 
of the cards in the plea bargaining game. The prosecutor is
 
viewed as having the power to determine the sentence. From a
 
defendant's perspective, a prosecutor's goal is to get
 
convictions and turn cases over as quickly as possible. In fact,
 
from a defendant's point of view, "money talks" and any defendant
 
with sufficient resources can buy his way out of almost any
 
trouble. Though many defendants do not have many resources, they
 
still have the ability to demand trial. But, according to
 
Casper, demanding a trial is really a bluffer's gamei it is a
 
threat and a bargaining counter, but most cases would not
 
actually go to trial.
 
According to Casper, the peculiar and somewhat hypocritical
 
nature of a system which is based upon the presumption of
 
innocence, due process values, and the criminal trial, but which
 
in practice is a game of plea bargaining, is reinforced by what
 
is known as the cop-out ceremony. After a defendant agrees to
 
plead guilty, he appears before a judge to enter his plea. The
 
defendant is asked questions about whether he is pleading guilty
 
because he is in fact guilty, about coercion or inducements to
 
plead, and about his satisfaction with representation afforded
 
him by his attorney. The questions are designed to make sure
 
that defendants are not pleading guilty to things they did not
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 do. Thus, a defendant must appear before a judge and go through
 
a ritual. The judge asks the defendants questions and the
 
defendant responds with lies; the judge knows they are lies and
 
accepts the defendant's answer as true.
 
In concluding his book, Casper discussed an area in which he
 
interviewed defendants to find out how they felt about the laws
 
they violated. With the exception of a few arrested on drug
 
charges, all the defendants believed that they had done something
 
"wrong." Defendants felt that the law they violated represented
 
a norm that was worthy of respect and that such law ought to be
 
followed. Without exception, all defendants felt that laws
 
against taking property from others were "good" laws and that
 
such behavior should not be tolerated but, in fact, merited
 
punishment. The men interviewed "accepted" the norms implicit in
 
criminal law. But they have not "internalized" them. More
 
important, the interviews suggest that most of the men believe
 
that law-abiding behavior is the product not of convention,
 
morality, or internalization of the norm itself, but rather of
 
external forces imposing constraints upon a person.
 
Reading and analyzing Casper's book, gives a good insight
 
as to how defendants feel about the criminal justice system. In
 
general, the book described the process from arrest of a
 
potential defendant to final disposition. The book gave
 
excellent examples of how cases are disposed of either through
 
plea bargaining or trial. The book discusses the points of view
 
of defendants, public defenders, prosecutors, the police and the
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judge. The book gives a detailed portrayal of the operations of
 
the criminal justice system.
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A NOTE ON PLEA BARGAINING AND CASE PRESSURE
 
MILTON HEUMANN
 
1975
 
According to Heumann, plea bargaining can be defined as the
 
process by which the defendant relinquishes his right to go to
 
trial in exchange for a reduction in charge/or sentence. The
 
pervasiveness of plea bargaining is suggested by the fact that
 
roughly only 10% of all criminal cases go to trial. In his
 
article, Heumann discusses an issue that plea bargaining and case
 
pressure "go together."
 
Much of the informed thought and literature on plea
 
bargaining assumes (or at least conveys the impression) that plea
 
bargaining can be best (though not necessarily exclusively)
 
understood as a function of case pressure. This idea comes from
 
many sources. For instance, in reviewing the literature:
 
"only the guilty plea system has enabled the courts to
 
process their caseloads with seriously inadequate
 
resources. Growing concessions to guilty plea
 
defendants have almost matched the growing need to
 
avoid burdensome business of trying cases" (Alschuler,
 
1968) and,
 
"So long as it remains impossible for our criminal
 
system to permit every defendant to claim his right to
 
a jury trial, some inducements for the surrender of
 
that right will be necessary (Yale Law Journal, 1972).
 
Hence,
 
"Realizing the need to relieve their congested dockets,
 
the courts have resorted to various methods to expedite
 
the legal process. In fact, plea bargaining is not
 
designed to accelerate the trial level but instead
 
eliminate it (Duquesne Law Review, 1971).
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According to Blumberg, "...the emergence of
 
bureaucratic due process--a nonadversary system of
 
justice by negotiation...consists of secret bargaining
 
sessions, employing subtle, bureaucratically-ordained
 
modes of coercion and influence to dispose of onerously
 
large caseloads in an efficacious-rational manner"
 
(Blumberg, 1967).
 
Heumann argues that comments like these are illustrative of the
 
purported case pressure-plea bargaining linkage, but, he states
 
that there is no evidence known to support this assumption.
 
In conducting his own study to analyze whether or not a
 
linkage between plea bargaining and case pressure occurs, Heumann
 
reviewed published reports from the State of Connecticut. He
 
also conducted 71 interviews with judges, prosecutors, public
 
defenders and private criminal attorneys. In his findings, he
 
states that it is at least eight times more likely that the
 
defendant will choose to plead guilty in lieu of trial. However,
 
the relative infrequency of trials compared to alternate modes of
 
disposition is not a recent phenomenon. It appears that the
 
trial, as far back as 1880, did not serve as a particularly
 
frequent source of case dispositions.
 
In concluding his article, Heumann states that guilty pleas,
 
and to a lesser extent nolo contendere pleas, have always been
 
the best traveled routes to case dispositions. Though indicating
 
that some of the steps followed in negotiating dispositions have
 
changed, the core notion of arranging a deal with the state's
 
attorney in return for a guilty plea was always central to the
 
practice of criminal law. Heumann states that; 1) between 80 to
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90% of the defendants in the superior court are factually guilty,
 
2) of these, a sizeable percentage have no substantial grounds to
 
contest the state's case, that is, they are factually and legally
 
guilty, 3) if the defendant pleads guilty, he is likely to be
 
rewarded in terms of a reduction in charge and/or sentence.
 
Thus, Heumann argues that there are other issues in which plea
 
bargaining arises rather than just case pressure.
 
Heumann's article seems to agree with two other pieces of
 
research (Newman and Blumberg). These classic pieces, like other
 
research, in a sense, state that plea bargaining is a type of
 
assembly line justice which is performed in a bureaucratic style.
 
According to these authors, plea bargaining is a negotiation
 
which occurs between a prosecutor and defense attorney with or
 
without the defendant's knowledge.
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JUSTICE BY CONSENTi PLEA BARGAINING IH THE
 
AMERICAN COURTHOUSE
 
ARTHUR ROSETT & DONALD R. CRESSEY
 
1976
 
Rosett and Cressey's JUSTICE BY CONSENT is a description of
 
the criminal justice system at work. The book provides a solid
 
introduction to the context of plea bargaining as well as
 
possible remedies to help control the overload of cases which
 
come to the American courthouses daily. In their book, Rosett
 
and Cressey argue that though plea bargaining can be defined or
 
viewed in various ways, it is basically the process by which the
 
defendant in a criminal case relinquishes his right to trial in
 
exchange for a reduction in charge and/or sentence. According to
 
Rosett and Cressey plea bargaining occurs so often in the
 
courthouse that the "trial court" should be viewed as a "plea
 
bargaining court". One interesting issue was brought out in their
 
book. Since plea bargaining occurs so much in our courthouses
 
most citizens have had some experience with the guilty plea,
 
perhaps from appearing in court in response to a traffic ticket.
 
The authors argue that citizens feel that for a traffic ticket,
 
it is easier to plead guilty, pay the fine, and go home rather
 
than pleading not guilty because another visit to the courthouse
 
will be necessary. Plea bargaining, therefore, occurs even at
 
the lowest level of the criminal justice system.
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Rosett and Cressey state that plea bargaining occurs almost
 
instantly when a case is brought to court. For instance, only a
 
limited number of cases are chosen for trial and they have an
 
ending result of severe punishment. Rosett and Cressey state
 
that out of every one hundred adults arrested for felony charges,
 
fewer than three are sent to prison. Thus, cases are not tried
 
or even decided, but are settled by compromise. Hence, the
 
criminal justice system, dominated by discretionary decisions, is
 
designed primarily to convince defendants to plead guilty.
 
Rosett and Cressey discussed the term "justice" in a section
 
of their book. Though they agreed that defining justice is very
 
difficult, nevertheless, justice is done when like situations are
 
treated alike. Each individual is to be subjected to general
 
rules, regardless of who they are. On the other hand, justice is
 
also done by giving each person what he/she deserves, by making
 
the punishment fit the crime and the criminal. However, Rosett
 
and Cressey also argue that a system of criminal justice that did
 
not take into account people's uniqueness and personality would
 
be so unmerciful and wasteful of human lives that few thinking
 
citizens would support it.
 
Rosett and Cressey argue that justice seems to be bought on
 
the cheap. Tactical considerations appear to dominate.
 
Prosecutors and defense lawyers dismiss or reduce charges and
 
agree upon sentences at times without ever consulting the
 
accused. Attorneys rarely expect to try a case and they appear
 
willing to strike any bargain that will allow them to avoid
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trial. In fact, the core of plea bargaining criticism is that
 
there seems to be something in it for everyone--defendant,
 
prosecutor, defense counsel, courts, jails, and prison
 
administrators--except the victim, society, and the police.
 
According to Rosett and Cressey, there is something deeply
 
disturbing about a criminal justice system in which the outcome
 
of cases depends on the personal interest and convenience of
 
those at the bargaining tables. In fact, it is deeply disturbing
 
when sentences are unrelated to the crime committed or to the
 
defendant's correctional needs. In all reality, the criminal
 
justice system seems to be harsher to the least powerful--the
 
poor, the black, and the young.
 
Rosett and Cressey introduced the issue of discretion in
 
their book. The authors mentioned that in our courthouses, the
 
courtroom actors (prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges,
 
probation officers, etc.) have a great amount of discretion
 
especially with cases which involve plea bargaining. In fact,
 
the actors are given ultimate discretion, no factual basis for
 
making reliable predictions, a command to do "justice" and
 
resources and due process demands that limit the capacity for a
 
trial about the facts of a crime to less than 15% of the serious
 
crimes brought to court. Thus, negotiated results dispose of
 
most criminal cases. In fact, as the volume of cases grows, the
 
courtroom actors develop their own intimacy and habits. Thus,
 
the disposition of criminal cases becomes a bureaucratic ritual
 
performed by professionals who feel that society has delegated to
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them a hopeless task. In conclusion, the disposition of criminal
 
charges by agreement between prosecutor and the accused sometimes
 
loosely called "plea bargaining" is considered an essential
 
component of the administration of justice.
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 UNDERSTANDING THE SHORT HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING
 
JOHN H. LANGBEIN
 
1979
 
As late as the eighteenth century, ordinary jury trials
 
at common law were a judge-dominated, lawyer-free procedure
 
conducted so rapidly that plea bargaining was unnecessary. The
 
rise 	of adversary procedures and the law of evidence made jury
 
trials unworkable as a routine to dispose of so many cases. A
 
variety of factors advanced the common law procedures in which
 
caseloads began to increase and thus, plea bargaining was in
 
demand.
 
Langbein's article discusses five areas which he used to
 
describe plea bargaining«
 
1. 	 Plea bargaining is a nontrial mode of procedure.
 
2. 	 This nontrial procedure subverts the design of our
 
Constitution which provides that "in all criminal
 
procedures, the accused shall enjoy the right to
 
.. . trial... by an impartial jury".
 
3. 	 ...We make it costly for an accused to claim his
 
Constitutional right because right now when an
 
accused is convicted following a jury trial, we
 
punish him twices once for the crime and for
 
"enjoying his right to a trial". We rely on a
 
deterrent effect to dissuade him to claim his
 
right to trial.
 
4. 	 With plea bargaining, the accused cannot present
 
defenses and have guilt proved beyond a reasonable
 
doubt.
 
5. 	 Plea bargaining has won the endorsement of the
 
Supreme Court because it is an "essential
 
component of the administration of justice.
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In his article, Langbein discusses how jury trials were used
 
in the middle of the eighteenth century. For instance, no voir
 
dire process was used, and between twelve and twenty felony cases
 
were tried per day. When jurors were chosen, they usually sat in
 
on and heard cases for a number of days. They also heard a few
 
cases at a time before making a decision as to the outcome of the
 
particular cases.
 
It is important to note that the most important factor that
 
expedited jury trials was the want of counsel. Hence, counsel
 
later took time to interview prospective jurors prior to letting
 
them sit on the jury. Another important issue was that
 
defendants were exercising their "privilege against self
 
incrimination" in a way that encouraged the accused to rely
 
entirely upon the pressure of counsel. A fourth area which was
 
discussed was that the presentation of evidence and the cross-

examination of witnesses was performed in a businesslike fashion
 
but lacked the time-consuming stiffness of a modern adversary
 
trial. Further, the common law of evidence was virtually
 
nonexistent and in the eighteenth century, there was no appeal
 
process in criminal cases. Hence, all these rights or privileges
 
which were not ordinarily observed by defendants was taking much
 
of court time and thus, was clogging up the system.
 
Historically, defendants were coerced into exercising their
 
rights of a jury trial. When jury trials were transformed,
 
however, the authorities would cease coercing the accused to
 
elect jury trial and instead, by more polite means, they would
 
26
 
coerce him to waive his jury trial rights. Hence, defendants
 
were getting what is known as a "bench trial". In conclusion,
 
plea bargaining was the result of the reduction of the trial by
 
jury process.
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PLEA BARGAINING IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAM
 
1979
 
Friedman's article explored the history of plea bargaining
 
as far back as 1880. He discussed a study examining Alameda
 
County, California from 1880 to 1970. In his article, Friedman
 
argues that plea bargaining does not stand by itself; it is part
 
of a process which is by no means new. Friedman argues that the
 
historical record supports those who doubt that plea bargaining
 
can be "abolished". He states that the problems of criminal
 
justice have deep roots, and reform will be difficult and slow.
 
Friedman states that the plea bargaining process certainly
 
does not serve as a deterrent to crime. For instance, in a cited
 
case, offenders were eagerly pleading guilty to the charge of
 
"stealing from a person" in order to avoid the charge of robbery,
 
which carried a heavier penalty. Friedman cited a New York
 
example where the district attorney encouraged defendants to
 
plead guilty to lesser offenses. Such "under the table" bargains
 
were the result of the district attorney not having time to worry
 
about petty crimes such as assault when there were murder crimes
 
to be solved.
 
In his article, Friedman argued, like Blumberg (1966), that
 
defense attorney persuaded their clients to plead guilty. In
 
most cases studied in Alameda County, California, many offenders
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changed their not guilty pleas to that of guilty because they
 
were either persuaded by their attorneys, were promised a lighter
 
sentence for a lesser charge, or out of remorse, self-hate etc.
 
(which was rare).
 
In his article, Friedman divided his study between three
 
distinct periods. In the first period beginning in 1880,
 
Friedman found that many defendants took a chance on trial by
 
jury, others pled guilty; and still others pled guilty and
 
claimed their "reward". In the second period, lasting until
 
about the 1950s, the guilty plea was much more dominant. It was
 
really worthwhile to plead guilty as trials became less common
 
and fewer cases were dismissed then before. In this period,
 
Friedman found that the defendant had less chance of acquittal if
 
he went to trial. Hence, pleading guilty was the only road to
 
probation. In the third period, after the 1950s, defendants most
 
always pled guilty. In this current period, defendants relied on
 
negotiations between attorneys more than anything. In fact, the
 
trial by jury option had decreased to a very small percentage as
 
did the percentage of acquittals.
 
In many instances, the trial by jury option was rarely used.
 
Now, the majority of trials are cut and dry with brief informal
 
trials being conducted. In conclusion, where trial by juries was
 
considered a norm between 1880-1950, society no longer feels that
 
jury trials are the normal way of dealing with those accused of a
 
crime.
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COMMENTS OM THE HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING
 
LYNN M. MATHER
 
1979
 
Mather argues that if any material is to aid our
 
understanding of contemporary plea bargaining, then the
 
conditions in which the plea bargaining practice began must be
 
explored. It is the author's opinion that plea bargaining began
 
based on two changes in the substance of the criminal law during
 
the mid-nineteenth century. Now, when cases undergo extensive
 
pretrial screening before they reach the court, there are
 
relatively few genuine disputes over guilt or innocence.
 
According to Mather, criminal law in the early nineteenth
 
century was based on the penology of Beccaria, Bentham, and other
 
utilitarian philosophers. Because the primary goal of punishment
 
was deterrence, sentences were to be determined according to the
 
offense rather than the offender. By the end of the century, a
 
"new penology" had emerged, based on a philosophy of
 
individualized sanctions that sought to reform {later
 
rehabilitate) the offender. In an effort to make the punishment
 
fit the individual, a variety of new procedures were introduced,
 
such as "determinate" sentences, prison classification systems,
 
juvenile courts, different penalties for youthful offenders, and
 
presentence investigations (Vasoli, 1965). Parole and probation
 
also developed during this period. In fact, probation evolved
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from the common law practice of suspending sentence into a more
 
formal program involving probation officers who made written
 
reports to the court. Between 1903 and 1923, California's Penal
 
Code Section 1203 was amended eight times to refine probation as
 
an alternative in sentencing.
 
Plea bargaining facilitated the individualization of
 
punishment. It was a way for judges and prosecutors to reach a
 
sentence that, in their view, would be more appropriate for the
 
needs of the individual offender. An important question is the
 
extent to which plea compromises actually reflect a concern for
 
substantive justice in the individual case rather than the
 
pressures of administrative expediency or simply political
 
influence. According to Moley though, " real justice can
 
sometimes be achieved best by compromising a case out of court"
 
(Moley, 1929).
 
The second change which Mather feels helps promote plea
 
bargaining was the tremendous growth of the criminal law.
 
Alschuler discusses this factor primarily in terms of the
 
administrative problems which face the courts as they try to cope
 
with the increased caseloads (Alschuler, 1968). According to
 
Mather, not only were the cases appearing in greater numbers,
 
they were also of a distinctly different type. In fact, the
 
offenses most frequently compromised included issuing bad checks,
 
forgery, auto theft, larceny, nonsupport, statutory rape, liquor
 
law violations, and motor vehicle offenses. For some of these
 
crimes, there was difficulty obtaining convictions and in others,
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civil remedies had been secured. For instance, defendants made
 
restitution for bad checks, returned stolen cars, provided for
 
their families, or married the underaged girl (Miller, 1927).
 
Hence, there was no serious infractions of the law being
 
committed.
 
In conclusion, the author states that many cases are now
 
being plea bargained because prosecutors feel that cases "do not
 
warrant felony treatment." Further, it is the author's opinion
 
that the problem of criminal law administrators is that they are
 
not only supposed to keep order and settle disputes, they must
 
also dramatize the moral values of the community and perhaps,
 
that is why plea compromises are seen as unacceptable because law
 
administrators tarnish the ideal of law enforcement.
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PLEA BARGAININGS THE 19TH CENTURY CONTEXT
 
MARK H. HALLER
 
1979
 
According to Haller, plea bargaining apparently arose
 
independently in a number of criminal courts in the 19th century.
 
These simultaneous developments were presumably related to a
 
number of broad structural changes that characterized American
 
Criminal Justice at the time. In his article, Haller discusses
 
ways in which such developments may have provided the context for
 
the institutionalization of plea bargaining as a method of case
 
disposition.
 
Both Alschuler and Friedman agree that plea bargaining was
 
probably nonexistent before 1800, began to appear during the
 
early or mid-nineteenth century, and became institutionalized as
 
a standard feature of American urban criminal courts in the last
 
third of the 19th century. In fact, during the twentieth century
 
there may have been periods of renewed growth of plea bargaining:
 
in the 1920s, especially in the federal courts faced with large
 
numbers of prohibition cases, and in the 1930s, perhaps related
 
to the growth of street crime.
 
In his article, Haller states that if plea bargaining
 
developed relatively independently in a number of local
 
jurisdiction at approximately the same time, the development was
 
most likely related to broad structural changes in the role of
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the courts. For instance, one factor shaping the criminal courts
 
in the nineteenth century was that the courts lost their dominant
 
position in criminal justice. That is, through the colonial
 
period, the courts generally controlled their caseloads because
 
they issued arrest warrants on complaint of aggrieved citizens.
 
By the 1840s and 1850s, however, modern police departments were
 
created to exercise patrol and detective functions. Police
 
departments also apprehended criminals. Further, full time
 
prosecutorial staffs developed and often handled charging
 
decisions, at least in serious cases. As a result, the control
 
that courts exercised over caseloads declined.
 
Another change which Haller mentioned in his article is the
 
development of imprisonment as a standard form of case
 
disposition. In the 19th century, the rise of state and local
 
prisons, combined with penal codes prescribing incarceration as a
 
standard penalty for a variety of crimes, introduced a new
 
element in sentencing. Hence, no longer was the sentence
 
designed to repair the damage to the victim; instead, fines or
 
imprisonment were penalties to deter or rehabilitate the
 
offender.
 
An important issue which is mentioned in Haller's article is
 
that the criminal justice system was not perceived by experienced
 
criminals as a place for legal adjudication but rather as a
 
system for bargaining and manipulation. For instance, Haller
 
discusses instances in which police departments recruited men who
 
had no formal schooling beyond the age of 13 or 14. Further, in
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the lower courts, the justices were nonlawyers and defendants
 
usually appeared in court without legal representation. Further,
 
legal attorneys usually had low social status which, in a sense,
 
forced them to bargain to any extent to get what they wanted.
 
hence, the criminal justice system was dominated by actors
 
neither trained nor oriented toward legality. Thus, the relative
 
lack of legal orientation was another part of the context within
 
which plea bargaining developed. As a result, the criminal
 
justice system was not perceived by experienced criminals as a
 
place for legal adjudication but rather as a system for
 
bargaining and manipulation. Plea bargaining, thus, arose at a
 
time when the actors in the system perceived the criminal justice
 
process as an arena for deals and favors.
 
In conclusion, it is reasonable to expect that at least two
 
types of plea bargaining may have coexisted in the late 19th
 
Century. One stemmed from the fact that defendants were
 
generally poor, sometimes foreign-born, and frequently
 
underrepresented by an attorney. Another types, stemming from
 
the political or corrupt nature of criminal justice would reflect
 
an agreement in which the exercise of political influence or the
 
use of bribery would be part of the deal.
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PLEA BAR6AIMIMG AND ITS HISTORY
 
ALBERT W. ALSCHULER
 
1979
 
Alschuler's article explores changes in guilty plea
 
practices and in attitudes toward the guilty plea from the Middle
 
Ages to the present. For most of the history of the common law,
 
Anglo-American courts did not encourage guilty pleas but actively
 
discouraged them. In fact, plea bargaining emerged as a
 
significant practice only after the American Civil War, and it
 
generally met with strong disapproval. The plea bargaining
 
practice nevertheless became a dominant method of resolving
 
criminal cases at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the
 
twentieth century.
 
To begin with, Alschuler defines plea bargaining as an
 
exchange of official concessions for the act of self-conviction.
 
The concessions given a defendant may relate to sentence, the
 
offense charged, or a variety of other circumstances. Such
 
concessions may proceed from any of a number of officials. The
 
benefit offered by the defendant, however, is always the same-­
entry of a plea of guilty.
 
During most of the history of our legal system, guilty pleas
 
were more discouraged than welcomed. Alschuler states in his
 
article that the practice of plea bargaining attracted
 
significant attention and criticism as a result of crime
 
commission studies in the 1920s. In his article, Alschuler
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mentioned four specific indications of plea bargaining prior to
 
the American Civil War. The first indication was that of John H.
 
Langbein's study in which he discovered that jury trials were
 
extremely rapid in an era when neither party was represented by
 
counsel. During this era, an informally selected jury might hear
 
several cases before retiring, and the law of evidence was almost
 
entirely undeveloped. During this time, Langbein found a number
 
of cases in which the court urged defendants to stand trial after
 
they had attempted initially to plead guilty.
 
A second indication of plea bargaining prior to the Civil
 
War emerged from J.S. Cockburn's examination of approximately
 
5,000 indictments between 1558-1625. During the first 30 years
 
of this period, confessions of guilt were virtually unknown. In
 
some cases, the indictments to which defendants confessed had
 
been altered: burglary charges had been reduced to larceny
 
charges, etc. During the final 35 years of Cockburn's study, the
 
altered indictments disappeared and the defendants entered
 
confessions in only 15 to 20% of the cases heard.
 
In a case conducted by David H. Flaherty (1749), there were
 
three defendants who pled guilty to theft from a brigantine after
 
the Attorney General announced that he would not prosecute them
 
for the burglary charged in the indictment. Flaherty found that
 
during this time guilty pleas were uncommon for crimes tried and,
 
even if a defendant had signed a confession upon a preliminary
 
examination, that confessions were usually rescinded and the
 
defendant sought trial by jury.
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 A fourth study conducted by Charles Cottu involved a
 
defendant who was charged with forging bank notes. In this case,
 
two indictments were prepared, one for forgery and the other for
 
possessing forged notes with the intentions of uttering them.
 
For the first indictment, punishment was death. In this case, if
 
the defendant pled guilty to the second indictment, he would be
 
convicted for a lesser offense upon his confession.
 
Alschuler stated that in order for plea bargaining to occur,
 
such pleading must be conducted strictly on a voluntary basis.
 
In fact, the formal requirement that a guilty plea be voluntary
 
is at least as old as the first English treatise devoted
 
exclusively to criminal law fStaundforde's pleas of the Crown 1
 
which declared that a guilty plea arising from "fear, menace, or
 
duress" should not be recorded. Further, the four types of
 
confessions (extrajudicial, confessions during interrogation,
 
nolo contenderes, and guilty plea confessions) must also occur
 
on a voluntary basis.
 
In concluding his article, Alschuler states that the growing
 
complexity of the criminal trial was not the only factor that
 
contributed to the development of contemporary plea bargaining.
 
Urbanization, increased crime rates, expansion of the substantive
 
criminal law, and the professionalization and increasing
 
bureaucratization of police, prosecution and defense functions
 
have also played crucial parts where plea bargaining is
 
concerned. For a variety of reasons, Alschuler argues that
 
society has come a long way from the time when guilty pleas were
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discouraged and litigation was thought "the safest test of
 
justice." Further, society has also come a long way from the
 
first appellate decision on plea bargaining, in which the court
 
refused to permit the right to trial to be defeated "by any
 
deceit or device."
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PLEA BARGAINING: A CRITICS REJOINDER
 
KENNETH KIPNIS
 
1979
 
Kipnis' paper is a reply or critique to two defenders of a
 
reformed system of plea bargaining: Thomas Church and Conrad
 
Brunk. In his paper, Kipnis argues that plea bargaining is a
 
twofold conflict with the constitutive purposes of the liberal-

democratic idea of a criminal justice system: the practice is
 
not conducive to the punishment of the guilty in accordance with
 
their deserts and it violates basic liberties. Among such
 
liberties is the right against self-incrimination and the right
 
to the lowest reasonable sentence.
 
Kipnis critiques Thomas Church and Conrad Brunk's papers in
 
which they both argue that plea bargaining, as presently
 
practiced, is improper. Though Church and Brunk give varying
 
views of plea bargaining, they are both reformers of the system
 
of plea bargaining. In their papers, their general thrust is to
 
rebut what they take to be the main arguments of the
 
abolitionists in order to lay to rest the most important doubts
 
about plea bargaining and begin the task of instituting the
 
needed reforms.
 
In his article, Kipnis discusses an area which he feels is
 
very important to the issue of plea bargaining. Kipnis argues
 
that jury trials remove the disposition of criminal cases from
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the control of bureaucrats and professionals. Where Church
 
argues that "trials are costly and psychologically unpleasant,"
 
Kipnis argues that jury trials serve many purposes for which
 
citizens may hold great responsibilities. Kipnis argues that
 
jury trials have t (1) stability} it immunizes the state against
 
much of the responsibility it would otherwise bear for the
 
miscarriages of justice, (2) security: they incorporate
 
protection against official abuse of the criminal justice system,
 
(3) openness; by opening up through citizen involvement, the
 
jury trial reduces the cynicism and contempt bred by less visible
 
proceedings, (4) democracy} the jury trial builds a kind of
 
check against dated law and overzealous officials and finally,
 
(5) participation: jury trials offer an opportunity for persons
 
to assume an important responsibility as citizens in a democracy.
 
Hence, Kipnis is in favor of abolishing the plea bargaining
 
system.
 
In his article, Kipnis argues that our system of criminal
 
justice can be best understood as an institutionalization of two
 
principles. The first is that those individuals who are clearly
 
guilty of serious specified wrongdoing deserve an officially
 
administered punishment proportional to their wrongdoing. In
 
fact, justice in punishment is realized when the guilty person
 
receives neither more nor less punishment than is deserved.
 
However, under the reforms advocated by Church and Brunk, those
 
accused who are tried by juries would be guaranteed
 
"theoretically correct" sentences, the sentence deserved by
 
41
 
persons who have done that with which they are charged.
 
According to Church and Brunk, those taking advantage of plea
 
bargains would have these sentences discounted in some way.
 
Kipnis argues that this systematic misapplication of punishment,
 
this structural injustice, is what discredits the legitimacy of
 
plea bargaining.
 
The second principle which Kipnis introduces in his paper is
 
that certain basic liberties shall not be violated' in bringing
 
the guilty to justice. The second principle underlies the system
 
of checks and balances. This principle addresses the right
 
against self-incrimination. Kipnis argues that under plea
 
bargaining and its system of discounted sentences, the accused
 
runs the risk of increased punishment if he refuses to
 
incriminate himself by pleading guilty. Hence, Kipnis argues
 
that plea bargaining violates a constitutional right secured by
 
the plain language of the Fifth Amendment.
 
In concluding his article, Kipnis argues that if he is
 
correct, then even the reformed plea bargaining system advocated
 
by Church and Brunk violates an inalienable right. Kipnis argues
 
that if bargained for sentences are reasonable sentences, then in
 
order for the bargain to be attractive, the bargained for
 
sentence must be lower than the sentence that could be expected
 
after conviction at trial. Hence, defendants under plea
 
bargaining are thus being permitted or encouraged to give up a
 
right that they should not be permitted to alienate. Kipnis
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feels that defendants should be entitled to both a fair trial and
 
the lowest reasonable sentence upon conviction.
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FROM PLEA NEGOTIATION TO COERCIVE JUSTICE: NOTES ON
 
THE RESPECIFICATION OF A CONCEPT
 
WILLIAM F. MCDONALD
 
1979
 
The purpose of McDonald's paper is to provide an adequate
 
conceptualization of the phenomena referred to as "plea
 
bargaining" or "plea negotiation." McDonald argues that the
 
concept of plea bargaining should not be restricted to either
 
pleas or bargains. In his opinion, the fundamental phenomenon is
 
the state's use of coercion to obtain the legal grounds for
 
imposing a penalty.
 
In his article, McDonald states that some prosecutors will
 
tell that in their jurisdictions no "plea bargaining" goes on,
 
but readily admit that many cases are "settled" before trial.
 
Even judges deny that any "plea negotiations" go on in their
 
courts. (In other countries, many conclude that they do not
 
"plea bargain" as we do in America, but however, many engage in
 
plea bargaining's functional equivalent). All these people are
 
right according to McDonald: there is nothing negotiable about
 
pleading guilty in those courts. Instead, defendants are simply
 
informed that they have a choice: they can either "plead guilty"
 
and get mercy or go to trial and face the consequences. Further,
 
defendants who do not challenge the prosecution's case can expect
 
greater leniency than those who deny their guilt.
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In his article, McDonald uses Newman's (1966) distinction
 
between explicit and implicit plea negotiations. In explicit
 
negotiations, the defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange
 
for some specified concession by the state. In implicit
 
negotiations, there is no bargaining but defendants learn they
 
will be punished more severely for going to trial. Negotiations
 
vary along three other important dimensions t whether the
 
agreement is treated as a legal contract, the amount of haggling
 
permitted, and who negotiates. Explicit bargains have some of
 
the earmarks of a legal contract, and thus, provides the
 
defendant with some procedural protection when the "contract" is
 
broken.
 
McDonald discusses a survey of plea bargaining by the
 
Georgetown Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure which found
 
that most negotiations were fairly explicit, Negotiations
 
usually involve defense counsel and prosecutors (and often
 
judges) who generally treated the agreement as contractually
 
binding. The survey conducted by Georgetown defined a negotiated
 
plea or plea bargain as "a defendant's agreement to plead guilty
 
to a criminal charge with the reasonable expectation of receiving
 
some consideration from the state." Hence, plea bargaining
 
involves reasonable expectations on the part of the defendant as
 
to a more lenient sentence if the defendant pleads guilty.
 
In concluding his article, McDonald feels that the
 
fundamental evil of plea bargaining is the state's improper use
 
of its coercive power. McDonald argues that the distinction
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between the compulsion to plead guilty and the compulsion to turn
 
state's evidence or render other services does not alter the
 
essential evil involved. Convictions obtained through coercion
 
are also evil. In his concluding remarks McDonald states, "Does
 
the state use its power to penalize in order to obtain the
 
grounds for imposing a penalty or obtaining a special service?"
 
Hence, the state's use of coercive power should be questioned
 
rather than the "plea bargaining" or "negotiated justice"
 
process.
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PLEA CONTRACTS IN WEST GERMANY
 
WILLIAM F. FELSTINER
 
1979
 
Felstiner's paper describes the West German version of the
 
plea bargaining. The paper explores the degree to which the use
 
of penal orders have avoided some of the negative practices
 
allegedly inherent in plea bargaining in the United States
 
namely, overcharging defendants, penalizing defendants who insist
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on going to:trial, and manipulating jail time to persuade
 
defendants to|plead guilty. In West Germany, cases are concluded
 
by the use of penal orders which are written proposals by the
 
i
|
 
state to a defendant stipulating the crime committed and the
 
penalty to be levied if the defendant does not object.
 
I I
 
In his I paper, Felstiner discusses in great detail penal
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orders. He states that penal orders are prepared by a prosecutor
 
and signed by a judge. The penal order describes the wrongful
 
i j
 
behavior of the defendant and the evidence gathered by the state
 
and indicates the applicable provisions of the criminal code.
 
The penal order then specifies the punishment to be imposed upon
 
the defendant and if the defendant does not object in writing or
 
in person within one week, the order becomes effective and has
 
the same status as a conviction after trial. With penal orders,
 
no imprisonment may be imposed, only fines and suspension of
 
driver's licenses.
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Penal orders may be used only for crimes called Verqehen,
 
the American equivalent of which is misdemeanors involving
 
criminal intent or criminal negligence and felonies concerned
 
with protecting property. Through the use of penal orders, 70%
 
of criminal cases were disposed of in the 1960s. In 1976, though
 
many motor vehicles and administrative law violations were
 
decriminalized, penal orders still disposed of nearly 70% of
 
cases.
 
It is important to mention that though prosecutors prepare
 
penal orders, their roles are quite different from that of
 
American prosecutors. For instance, a West German trial is run
 
by the judge not by the prosecutors and defense counsel. A
 
German trial is prepared by police officers who conduct
 
evidentiary hearings, interview victims/witnesses and defendants.
 
The police conduct their own investigations to determine the
 
facts of a case. If there is enough evidence against the
 
accused, then the police turn over all their evidence and
 
investigatory information to the prosecutors who then file a
 
penal order with the courts.
 
In concluding his paper, Felstiner argues that a West
 
Germany penal order is equivalent to plea bargaining an American
 
traffic ticket. Felstiner had proposed that the American courts
 
adopt a penal order system but, that system, or a system like it,
 
is already being used in America--that system being plea
 
bargaining. Though the functions of a judge, prosecutor, and the
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police vary from West Germany to the United States, the disposal
 
of criminal cases remains, in a sense, the same.
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PLEADING GUILTY IN LOWER COURTS
 
MALCOLM M. FEELEY
 
1979
 
Feeley's paper examines the practice of pleading guilty to
 
petty offenses in lower courts and questions some of the long
 
standing assumptions about the plea bargaining process. In his
 
paper, Feeley argues that though plea bargaining of the classical
 
type rarely occurs, the term itself and certain aspects of
 
bargaining continue to serve important symbolic functions.
 
Feeley states that the simple logic of plea bargaining is so
 
compelling that it is now often taken for granted.
 
Feeley argues that in the conventional view of plea
 
bargaining, the defendant extracts concessions; either the
 
reduction of charge or sentence recommendation, in exchange for
 
pleading guilty. This view is based on the assumption that the
 
defendant will go to trial. However, many defendants in lower
 
criminal courts never seriously contemplate trial, although they
 
do plead guilty. Further, defendants plead guilty for various
 
reasons. For instance, people may plead guilty for the mere fact
 
that private attorneys may charge $200 or more per day to conduct
 
a trial, yet few fines exceed $50. Hence, prosecutors are aware
 
of the possible costs to the defendant and they know that
 
defendants threats to go to trial are rarely carried out.
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In his article, Feeley compares the plea bargaining process
 
to that of a supermarket. He states that the reality of American
 
lower courts is akin to supermarkets in which prices for various
 
commodities have been clearly established and labelled in
 
advance. Arriving at an exchange in this context is not an
 
explicit bargaining process designed to reach a mutually
 
acceptable agreement. In a supermarket, as in a lower court,
 
customers (or defendants) complain about prices, but they rarely
 
"bargain" to get them reduced. In a lower court setting, like in
 
a supermarket, prices or punishments are fixed as compared to a
 
higher court level.
 
In his article, Feeley states that many of the trappings of
 
the classical plea bargaining process still exist and that they
 
serve important symbolic functions. For instance, the trappings
 
furnish the illusion of a "deal" and allow an attorney to muster
 
tangible evidence of the value of his service to allay the doubts
 
of an often skeptical client. In a classic plea bargain, the
 
defendant attempts to secure a reduced charge or a guaranteed
 
sentence in exchange for his guilty plea. In the lower courts
 
though, both types of concessions occur on a regular basis.
 
However, the "deals" which are made in the lower courts are not
 
in fact "deals" but are the "going rate" for certain crimes as
 
compared to felony level courts.
 
In concluding his article, Feeley states that those who
 
generalize about plea bargaining have only a small set of
 
criminal cases in mind, usually felony rather than the petty
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offenses. Hence, Feeley tries to caution against unwarranted
 
inferences and overgeneralizations about the notion of plea
 
bargaining. Feeley states that the process of pleading guilty
 
has almost become synonymous with plea bargaining and Feeley
 
cautions against this.
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PLEA BARGAINING AND PLEA NEGOTIATION IN ENGLAND
 
JOHN BALDWIN
 
MICHAEL McCONVILLE
 
1979
 
Plea bargaining is a fact of life in the English criminal
 
justice system. Though it is not practiced on the same scale as
 
it is in the United States, its true dimensions are only now
 
beginning to emerge. Although the plea bargaining practice is
 
denied and/or opposed by English Appellate courts, plea
 
bargaining thrives in a climate actually determined by the
 
principles and procedures approved by the Court of Appeal itself.
 
In both England and the United States, a great majority of
 
cases will be settled by a plea of guilty. In England, for
 
example, about 85 percent of defendants charged with indictable
 
criminal offenses plead guilty. In the United States, it would
 
seem that the proportion of guilty pleas is even higher (90
 
percent). Since plea bargaining occurs quite often, the
 
importance of the guilty plea has been recognized and has led
 
American researchers to devote considerable attention to
 
examining the factors that cause defendants to plead guilty.
 
I
 
The American evidence clearly demonstrates that a large
 
majority of guilty pleas are the result of some kind of out-of­
court bargaining. By comparison though, researchers in England
 
have displayed little interest in guilty pleas and the courts
 
have been reluctant to acknowledge that a plea of guilty can be
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anything other than a full, free, and voluntary decision by the
 
defendant. More specifically though, the idea of plea bargaining
 
has traditionally been regarded as repugnant to the English legal
 
system. In fact in England, it is believed that such bargains or
 
pressures do not exist.
 
It is interesting to note a comparison between United States
 
and England prosecutor roles as mentioned in Baldwin and
 
HcConville's article. For instance, in the United States, the
 
prosecutor wields considerable power? he decides whether or not
 
to proceed with a prosecution; he may agree to reduce a
 
particular charge; and he can recommend a particular sentence to
 
the court. In England, on the other hand, criminal prosecutions
 
are not usually conducted by professional prosecutors at all. In
 
the English courts, prosecutions are conducted by barristers who
 
act both as prosecutors and defense lawyers in various cases. A
 
barrister does not have an unsupervised power to manipulate
 
charges and a specific sentence recommendation by prosecuting
 
counsel would be quite unethical. Hence, it is the trial judge
 
who has power to make decisions.
 
In conclusion, no matter who has the final decision making
 
power in either the United States or in England, according to
 
Baldwin and HcConville, defendants are still "pressured" into
 
pleading guilty for numerous considerations. Though it is quite
 
clear that there is no highly organized "system" of plea
 
bargaining in England, many defendants seem to have been involved
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in a process that resembles plea bargaining more closely than has
 
been appreciated.
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AN EXPERIENCE IN JUSTICE WITHOUT PLEA NEGOTIATION
 
SAM W. CALLAN
 
1979
 
Sam Callan's article discusses a dissatisfaction of plea
 
bargaining on the part of judges and the public. The author
 
discusses an experiment conducted in El Paso County, Texas, in
 
which plea bargaining was abolished between 1975 to 1978. In his
 
article, Callan found it necessary to distinguish between "plea
 
bargaining" and "plea negotiation." He argues that any
 
inducement to plead guilty, whether expressed or implied,
 
negotiated or fixed, constitutes the odious practice of plea
 
bargaining. He feels that a plea of guilty is produced by the
 
implied threat that, if the defendant refuses to accept what the
 
prosecutor believes is a just sentence, the prosecutor and the
 
judge will see to it that the defendant gets an unjustly harsh
 
sentence.
 
The El Paso system which was established for experimental
 
purposes was due to a reaction to public dissatisfaction with
 
four aspects of plea bargaining. Such dissatisfaction was based
 
ont (1) plea bargaining inevitably produces the ridiculous result
 
that, as crime grows worse, sentencing becomes more lenient. As
 
crime grows worse, the number of cases on the criminal docket
 
increases, hence, prosecutors need to offer better deals; {2)
 
plea negotiation is the focal point of public distrust of the
 
law; (3) plea negotiation produces unequal justice and, (4) the
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law says that judges are to impose sentence but under plea
 
negotiations, prosecutors assess sentence. Though there is so
 
much public dissatisfaction with plea bargaining, the only factor
 
that justifies plea negotiations is economic expediency.
 
The experiment conducted in El Paso, Texas, consisted of
 
abolishing plea negotiations. Though the statistics used were
 
difficult to generalize from due to the population of 400,000
 
nevertheless, the crime rate and statistics used were not too far
 
from the national average. In his experiment, Callan adopted as
 
the purpose of sentencing to be: "let the control fit the
 
criminal" rather than "the punishment fit the crime." Callan
 
argues that "imposing adequate control incidentally produces
 
whatever general deterrence can be achieved through punishment.
 
Further, by control, Callan means controlling the number of cases
 
in which probation is offered as opposed to incapacitation.
 
Hence, Callan introduces a point system to be adopted.
 
With Callan's point system, various factors are considered
 
important when determining whether to grant probation,
 
imprisonment, or the length of sentences to be considered. If
 
the defendant has a prior record, probation is usually not
 
considered. The purpose of the point system is broken down into
 
four elementst (1) it focuses the judges mind on the factors
 
proper to sentencing; (2) it commits the judge in advance to the
 
factors he will consider, thus allowing observers to see and
 
publicize any special treatment of a criminal that violates the
 
principle of equal justice; (3) it allows the defendant to
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predict what the judges sentence is apt to be? and (4) it
 
contains the express promise that the defendant can withdraw his
 
plea if the judge believes he should impose a more severe
 
sentence. It is important to mention that the point system does
 
not control the sentence, each case is evaluated on an individual
 
basis.
 
By adopting a system as that in El Paso, Texas, cases in the
 
docket will move more rapidly, the public distrust will be
 
reduced, unequal justice will be diminished, and the judge's
 
decision will be much more respected. In concluding his article,
 
Callan states that the El Paso experiment has failed to prove
 
that "El Paso can do without plea negotiations." Though the
 
experiment has created a docket crises, Callan argues that his
 
system is a worthwhile system which should work in any area with
 
minor improvements. He argues that finding worthwhile judges who
 
will help to move the case docket more rapidly is of great
 
importance if the system is to work.
 
58
 
IN DEFENSE OF "BARGAIN JUSTICE"
 
THOMAS W. CHURCH. JR.
 
1979
 
According to Church, the strongest critics of plea
 
bargaining argue that the practice should be abolished because it
 
coerces defendants to give up their right to trial and because it
 
results in irrational sentences for criminal defendants. In
 
fact, there are two separate arguments to support the recommended
 
abolition of plea bargaining. The first focuses on procedural
 
fairness for individual defendants. The second argument is
 
geared towards societal interest of rational criminal sentences.
 
For instance, plea bargaining particularly in pressured urban
 
jurisdictions, is said to encourage harried prosecutors and
 
judges to make dispositional concessions to defendants on the
 
sole ground of administrative expediency. In the author's
 
opinion though, reforming rather than eliminating plea bargaining
 
should be of greater importance.
 
According to Church, if plea bargaining cannot readily be
 
eliminated and operated in a tolerable or even desirable manner
 
in many jurisdictions, than a careful examination of abolitionist
 
arguments is surely in order. In fact, according to Church,
 
bargain justice does not appear to suffer from the systematic
 
irrationality and unfairness attributable to it by many critics.
 
As a matter of fact, according to Chief Justice Burger, in the
 
case of Santobello v. N.Y. (404 U.S. 257-260. 1971);
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"Plea bargaining... is an essential component of the
 
administration of justice. Properly administered, it
 
is encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected
 
to a full-scale trial, the states would have to
 
multiply the number of judges and court facilities."
 
In his article, Church discusses the issue of defendants who
 
are factually versus legally innocent. He argues that the
 
factually innocent defendant at times would be willing to plead
 
guilty if he knows that his chances of a harsh sentence and/or
 
acquittal are slim. An innocent defendant would plead guilty if
 
he and/or his counselor feel that the defendant would be found
 
guilty depending on the circumstances or evidence held by the
 
prosecutor. On the other hand, a legally innocent defendant is
 
one who has illegally obtained evidence used against him in a
 
court of law. Further, a legally innocent defendant is one who
 
for some reason or another cannot be tried possibly, due to some
 
weakness in the case (acquittals).
 
In the author's opinion, the case against bargain justice is
 
typically based upon the widespread view that plea bargaining
 
results in excessive and undeserved leniency in the sentencing of
 
admitted criminals. According to Church, "Since the prosecutor
 
must give up something in return for the defendant's agreement to
 
plead guilty, the frequent result of plea bargaining is that
 
defendants are not dealt with as severely as might otherwise be
 
the case." Thus, plea bargaining results in leniency that
 
reduces the deterrent impact of the law. However, Church argues
 
that this problem can be solved by eliminating the sentencing
 
differential between plea and trial convictions. But, like the
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due process critique of plea bargaining, however. Church's
 
argument ignores the uncertainty and risk of trial.
 
Church argues that plea bargaining, particularly when judge
 
or prosecutor manipulate post-trial sentences to "punish" those
 
who refuse to plead guilty can also operate to coerce or unfairly
 
encourage guilty pleas. Further, Church states that bargain
 
justice in a court whose resources are inadequate to its caseload
 
may very well result in excessively lenient sentences. But, in
 
Church's opinion, it is quite possible to construct a system of
 
plea negotiation that is at least as defensible as the trial
 
process upon which it is based.
 
In concluding his article, Church introduces four
 
theoretical assumptions concerning the operation or reform of
 
plea bargaining. First, those cases that go to trial must be
 
decided on the merits, without penalizing the defendant for not
 
pleading guilty. Second, every defendant should be represented
 
by counsel throughout the negotiations. Third, if plea
 
negotiations are to focus on predicted trial outcome, all
 
information and evidence bearing on that outcome should be
 
available equally to prosecution and defense. The final
 
requirement for a defensible plea bargaining system may be that
 
most defendants who do go to trial may be unable to absorb the
 
costs, thus, maybe getting unfair treatment. Hence, each side
 
should possess or have access to sufficient resources to take a
 
case to trial. Church's concluding remarks are that a system of
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negotiated justice can be as defensible as the trial system upon
 
which the negotiations are based.
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PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE; EVALUATION OF A REFORM IM
 
PLEA BARGAINING
 
ANNE M. HEINZ
 
WAYNE A. KERSTETTER
 
1979
 
Plea bargaining which is the primary mode of criminal charge
 
disposition has been under sustained attack for some time. In
 
fact, the U.S. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
 
Standards and Goals urged that such negotiations should be
 
abolished. But, despite criticism from many, there are few
 
indications that the practice is about to disappear. The major
 
criticism of plea bargaining is that is penalizes the defendant
 
who wishes to assert his constitutional right to trial (U.S.
 
National Advisory Commission, 1973). As a consequences, innocent
 
persons may plead guilty to avoid the more severe sanctions that
 
follow conviction at trial. Though plea bargaining cannot or has
 
not been abolished, many changes are currently being introduced
 
to help eliminate the backlogging of courts.
 
In 1974, Norval Morris proposed that judges should play a
 
more active role in plea negotiations and that the victims and
 
defendants should also be invited to participate. To fulfill
 
this proposal, Heinz and Kerstetter conducted a field experiment
 
design in which they randomly chose 1074 cases, 378 were assigned
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to use a pretrial settlement conference; the remainder were the
 
control group.
 
The field experiment in Dade County, Florida, evaluated the
 
use of a pretrial settlement conference as a means of
 
restructuring plea negotiations. All negotiations took place in
 
front of a judge, victim, defendant, and arresting police officer
 
who were invited to attend.
 
In order to minimize administrative problems which may
 
occur, Heinz and Kerstetter used only cases that had already
 
passed the arraignment state. Victims and police officers were
 
invited by the prosector to attend the conference unless their
 
eyewitness identification of the defendant was a crucial element
 
in the case. The victims were neither subpoenaed nor
 
compensated. The defendant could decide to attend with counsel,
 
not to attend but to be represented by counsel, or fail to
 
confirm the conference, thus cancelling it. At the conference,
 
the judge would indicate the purpose of the meeting and state
 
that, for purposes of discussion, the defendant's guilt of the
 
charge was to be assumed. Such assumption was necessary to make
 
it clear that the defendant was not admitting guilt by
 
participating in the discussion.
 
Prior to the implementation of the conference procedure, the
 
average time from arraignment to disposition was 126 days; the
 
conference procedure reduced the time of disposition to roughly
 
three weeks. But, the actual negotiation process had not been
 
significantly altered by the use of the conference. Hence, the
 
64
 
greatest impact of the conference procedure was to shorten the
 
length of time it took to close cases.
 
It would be difficult to ascertain whether or not this
 
experiment would be a feasible solution to the plea bargaining
 
problem. It seems as yet another alternative to reduce the
 
amount of time that a case takes to get through the criminal
 
justice system. However, if such a change would help reduce the
 
amount of time to settle a case, a change such as this would
 
seem to improve the plea bargaining--court process.
 
65
 
ALASKA'S BAN OF PLEA BARGAINING
 
MICHAEL L. RUBINSTEIN
 
TERESA J. WHITE
 
1979
 
Plea bargaining was banned by Alaska's Attorney General
 
in August of 1975. The Attorney General issued written
 
instructions forbidding all district attorneys and their
 
assistants from engaging in plea bargaining for all felony and
 
misdemeanor prosecutions filed as of August 15, 1975. The
 
Attorney General announced this new policy in a jurisdiction in
 
which explicit sentence bargaining had been central to the
 
practice of criminal law. In fact, prior to August 15, 1975,
 
plea bargaining was a fully institutionalized reality in Alaska;
 
a reality that had gained total judicial acceptance.
 
The Attorney General's purpose of his new policy was to
 
"return the sentencing function back to the judges." His goal
 
was to "clean up the least just aspect of the criminal system."
 
The Attorney General wanted to eliminate the former practices in
 
which district attorneys, defense lawyers and judges settled
 
cases, in an assembly line fashion. Neither district attorneys
 
nor defense lawyers liked the new policy because they were going
 
to have to work much harder in preparing for more trials, but
 
they did feel a sense of relief to be out of the sentencing
 
business.
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In order to find out if the Attorney General's policy
 
improved the quality of justice, Rubinstein and White conducted a
 
longitudinal study which covered a period of two years (1975­
1978). During their research, 400 interviews were conducted in
 
three major cities of Alaska. Further, 3,586 case files
 
involving about 2,300 defendants were also analyzed. These cases
 
came tot he court prior to the ban and served as comparison cases
 
during the study. The statistical objective was to discover
 
variables associated with any of a variety of outcomes (such as
 
charge rejection, dismissal, acquittal, conviction, probation,
 
and sentence length). The statistical evidence showed that the
 
frequency of what was once the dominant practice among
 
experienced criminal attorneys declined drastically« sentence
 
recommendations occurred in only 4 to 12 percent of convicted
 
cases. In fact, where charge bargaining occurs now, it usually
 
involved dropping one or more counts from multiple-count
 
indictments.
 
When the Attorney General first advanced his decision to
 
plea bargaining, panic spread through the Alaska court system,
 
there was concern that without plea bargaining, many cases would
 
have to go to trial. In fact, a massive slowdown in the criminal
 
docket was anticipated. Though none of these predictions
 
occurred, what was interesting was that there was a dramatic
 
decrease in disposition time (measured from the date of filing a
 
complaint to final trial court outcome). In analyzing the data,
 
it was found that the plea bargaining ban did not cause this
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decline. In fact, the court administrators have been preparing
 
for the worst and changed their calendar procedures to eliminate
 
most all types of delay.
 
One important change which occurred was the impact of
 
sentencing practices. In fact, sentencing became much more
 
severe but, the new plea bargaining policy was not found to
 
impact sentences. The increase of sentences was said to be
 
attributable to a demand to "get tough" on violent crimes.
 
However, the only real increase which occurred was for defendants
 
with first-time felony convictions. Hence, the defendants with
 
first-time felony convictions were no longer given merely
 
probation.
 
In concluding the article, Rubinstein and White argued that
 
though the ban on plea bargaining has placed more decisional
 
responsibility on judges, the ban has been unable to eliminate
 
badly exercised discretion. For instance, a defendant's income
 
still affects the quality of the trial. Hence, there are
 
indications that race, income and employment status still
 
determine the impact of sentencing.
 
In evaluating the article, most all literature which
 
discusses plea bargaining is concerned with abolishing plea
 
bargaining or reforming it in some way. But, like all other
 
literature, no simple solution to the plea bargaining process can
 
or has been found. The most important question in regards to
 
plea bargaining should be "how will the courts function without
 
plea bargaining?"
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THE SENTENCE BARGAINING OF UPPERWORLD AMD UNDERWORLD
 
CRIME IN TEN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
 
JOHN HAGAN
 
ILENE NAGEL BERNSTEIN
 
1979
 
The authors of this article explore the use of different
 
types of sentence bargaining tactics in tent federal district
 
courts. Hagan and Bernstein distinguish between proactive and
 
reactive prosecutorial functions and they hypothesize that
 
proactive prosecution of upperworld crime is associated with more
 
explicit sentence bargaining than is the reactive prosecution of
 
underworld crimes.
 
In their article, Hagan and Bernstein argue that federal
 
courts, unlike state courts, have the capacity and jurisdiction
 
to prosecute many forms of upperworld crime, although they do not
 
always exercise that authority. Further, Hagan and Bernstein
 
argue that a prosecutorial focus on upperworld crimes in the
 
federal district courts is associated with the use of specific
 
types of bargaining tactics that involve a strategic and explicit
 
position of coercive threats and promised concessions.
 
In their article,. Hagan and Bernstein conducted research
 
based on field work done on federal courts in ten districts.
 
They considered qualitative data obtained through site visits to
 
each of the ten districts during which they observed
 
approximately 200 hours of court proceedings. Hagan and
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Bernstein conducted approximately 600 hours of interviews with
 
court personnel involved in decision making functions in criminal
 
courts. Among those interviewed were the chief judge and three
 
to five presiding judges, the United States Attorney, and
 
Assistant United States Attorneys responsible for subsections of
 
the office dealing with criminal matters. The chief probation
 
officer and other court officials were also interviewed.
 
There are differences between state and federal
 
prosecutorial functions. According to Hagan and Bernstein, the
 
state system of prosecution is, in a sense, reactive whereas the
 
federal system is proactive. Hagan and Bernstein argue that
 
state courts are organized almost exclusively to respond to cases
 
brought to them by local police. As the federal level, on the
 
other hand, the courts have much greater potential for
 
selectively determining the composition and size of their case
 
loads. Despite the fact that federal courts receive the bulk of
 
their case referrals from federal enforcement agencies (FBI, DEA,
 
IRS), they are not limited to agency input. In fact, at the
 
federal level, prosecutors prosecute crimes which seem to be rare
 
so as to limit the crime from growing. j
 
Another difference between state and federal courts is the
 
way in which each plea bargains. For instance, state criminal
 
codes include lesser offenses to which charges frequently can be
 
reduced whereas federal criminal codes cannot, j Further,
 
according to Hagan and Bernstein, charge reduction ils extremely
 
common at the state level and relatively infrequent, in federal
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 courts. Hence, federal criminal codes less frequently include
 
graded offenses.
 
In concluding their article, Hagan and Bernstein presented
 
evidence which suggest that proactive prosecution df upperworld
 
I
 
I
 
crime leads to more explicit sentence bargaining, whereas
 
reactive prosecution of underworld crime involves lless. Hagan
 
and Bernstein argue that since federal crimes have 1ess witnesses
 
or highly visible victims to testify about the criminal events;
 
it is usually necessary to cultivate sources of information and
 
evidence from within the criminal operation. Hence, a favorable
 
plea bargaining settlement must arise prior to the defendant's
 
willingness to help solve the criminal activity.
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 LEGALITY AND EQUALITY« PLEA BARGAINING IN THE PROSECUTION OF
 
WHITE-COLLAR AND COMMON CRIMES
 
JACK KATZ
 
1979
 
In his article, Jack Katz mentions differences in the
 
prosecution of white-collar and common crime in order to draw out
 
implications for equality in current proposals to reform plea
 
bargaining. Katz argues that in the case of plea bargaining.
 
proposals to reform have tacitly been aimed at a subset of crimes
 
and their corresponding enforcement roles. According to Katz,
 
reforms that would make bargaining over formal dispositions more
 
consistent with legality or "due process" appear likely to
 
discourage lenience in the prosecution of common crimes while
 
i
 
leaving largely unaffected the low visibility exercise of the
 
power not to prosecute white-collar crime.
 
According to Katz, one of the most common critidisms of plea
 
i i
 
bargaining is that charges are unaccountably reduced between
 
j
 
arrest and final disposition, Further, critics assume that plea
 
bargaining takes place against a background of fonraal charges
 
that have already been filed. However, nonei of these
 
perspectives appear to apply to plea bargaining in ' cases where
 
I
 
there is no arrest, no alibi defense, no "police report," no
 
readily identifiable victim. Hence, understandings (or plea
 
bargains) are reached before any charges are filed. According to
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Katz, current analysis of the problems of plea bargaining and
 
proposals for reform by and large ignore the prosecution of
 
white-collar crime. ■ 
In his article, Katz discusses the fact that definitions of
 
white-collar crime have been notoriously unsatisfactory. He
 
argues that the term is filled with political overtones--it seems
 
inevitably to imply "unequal treatment." Various' inconsistent
 
: i
 
meanings have been advocated thus, many of the difficulties with
 
current definitions fall into three categories. The first is a
 
failure to separate analytically the criminals social class
 
position from the criminal behavior. The second category is that
 
there are relatively few crimes that can be committed only by
 
those in white-collar occupations {ie: price fixing,| political
 
contributions by corporations, and extortions under color of
 
, i
 
official right). The third category is that most common crimes
 
can be committed by members of both "white-collar" and "blue­
collar" classes (ies a Patsy Hearst can commit a bank robbery).
 
In Katz's opinion though, if the social class of the criminal is
 
not sufficient to define the category, than neither is the
 
structure of criminal behavior.
 
An important issue mentioned by Katz which is used as a
 
comparison of white-collar crime to that of common crime is that
 
in the purest "white-collar" crimes, white-collar social class
 
position is used: (1) to diffuse criminal intent into ordinary
 
occupational routines so that it escapes unambiguous expression
 
!
 
of any specific discrete behavior; (2) to accomplish :the crime
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without incidents or effects that furnish presumptive evidence of
 
its occurrence before the criminal has been identified. The
 
I
 
position is also used (3) to cover up the culpable knowledge of
 
participants through exerted action that allows each to claim
 
ignorance. Katz argues that in order to convict someone of a
 
i
 
"pure' white-collar crime, prosecutors must build a case to show
 
that a crime has been "disguised" in each of three ways. The
 
position or scheme was designed so that neither its means nor its
 
consequences would reveal that a crime had occurred. Hence,
 
criminals would be able to maintain silence or ignorance should
 
there be an investigation. I
 
In his article, Katz discusses the social organization of
 
the prosecution of white-collar and common crimes which present
 
prosecutorial discretion in two different forms. First, social
 
distance between prosecutor and police produces a public record
 
of law enforcement against common crimes that overrepresents
 
decisions not to prosecute (giving an impression that the
 
prosecutor is bargaining away legitimate power). The exercise of
 
i
 
the power not to prosecute is often invisible to the public eye
 
in regards to prosecuting white-collar crime. On the other hand,
 
when common crimes are concerned, decisions to file, dismiss
 
charges, accept pleas, or go to trial will be subject to public
 
scrutiny which will, more than likely, influence a prosecutor's
 
decision in regards to the cases.
 
I
 
In concluding his article, Katz argues that plea bargaining
 
frustrates equal justice especially since the white-collar
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defendant will be able to retain more effective counsel. But,
 
many substantive irrelevant factors influence plea bargaining in
 
both categories of crime. In Katz's opinion, if plea bargaining
 
is objectionable because it permits variation in the availability
 
and quality of counsel to affect convictions and disposition,
 
that objection is equally applicable to prosecutions of white-

collar and common crimes alike.
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MANDATORY SENTENCING AND THE ABOLITION OF PLEA
 
BARGAINING; THE MICHIGAN FELONY FIREARM
 
STATUTE
 
MILTON HEUMANN
 
COLIN LOFTIN
 
1979
 
According to the authors, two features of the American
 
criminal justice system most often criticized are unbridled
 
prosecutorial and judicial discretion. Further, prosecutors
 
engage in a wide variety of plea bargaining practices
 
unencumbered by appellate court constraints and similarly, judges
 
have a wide range of sentencing options for any particular
 
defendant or charge. In fact, critics of plea bargaining and
 
indeterminant sentencing are quick to point out the shortcomings
 
of the present system. For instance, on the one hand, it is
 
argued that undue leniency results from prosecutorial and
 
judicial eagerness to grant concessions to the defendant who
 
pleads. On the other hand, defendants who do not plead or who
 
are "singled out" by the prosecutor or judge are subject to harsh
 
treatment.
 
In their article, Haemin and Loftin attempt to study the
 
consequences of abolishing plea bargaining along with the
 
introduction of mandatory sentencing simultaneously. Heumann and
 
Loftin examined Wayne County in Detroit, Michigan. In that
 
county, the prosecutor prohibited his subordinates from plea
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 bargaining in any case in which a recently enacted state statute
 
warranted a mandatory sentence in regards to firearms.
 
Michigan's Felony Firearm Statute went into effect on January 1,
 
1977. The statute mandated a two-year prison sentence in
 
addition to the sentence for the primary felony for any defendant
 
who possesses a firearm while engaging in a felony. The two year
 
consecutive sentence cannot be suspended nor can an individual be
 
paroled while serving time for a firearm offense. While
 
mandating this two year sentence, the prosecutor of Wayne County
 
publicly announced that his office would not engage in any plea
 
bargaining in cases in which the Gun Law applied.
 
To conduct their study, Heumann and Loftin examined the
 
impact of the new Gun Law simultaneously with the abolition of
 
plea bargaining {the abolition of plea bargaining as related to
 
firearm offenses). They studied a period of six months both
 
before and after the Michigan Statute came into affect. Heumann
 
and Loftin limited their study to only one jurisdiction from
 
Wayne County. In their study, twenty-three interviews were
 
conducted with court personnel (judges, prosecutors, and defense
 
attorneys). In addition, crime, defendant, and disposition data
 
I ■ 
were collected for seven categories of offenses (armed robbery,
 
felonious assault, murder, criminal sexual conduct, etc.). The
 
issue which was explored was whether the Gun Law together with
 
the Prosecutor's policy have increased the certainty of sentences
 
delivered by the court and whether the sentence is five years or
 
more. The strongest statement that can be made is that for every
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100 robbery c^ses, an average of seven defendants who would have
 
received a two-to five-year sentence prior to the new statute now
 
receive a sentence of five years or more.
 
In concluding their article, Heumann and Loftin found that
 
sentence bargaining and sentence adjustment was still occurring.
 
For instance, though the prosecutors could not bargain with the
 
two-year sentence of crimes which involved the use of a firearm,
 
prosecutors were still bargaining with the other portion of the
 
sentence (iei assault and assault with a firearm--the assault
 
portion was still being bargained). Hence, prosecutors were
 
giving the two-year mandatory sentence which was required, but
 
were bargaining or adjusting the rest of the sentence according
 
to the "going rate" which occurred six months prior to the Gun
 
Law Statute.
 
78
 
DOES IT PAY TO PLEA GUILTY? DIFFERENTIAL SENTENCING AND THE
 
FUNCTIONING OF CRIMINAL COURTS
 
DAVID BRERETON
 
JONATHAN D. CASPER
 
1981
 
If there is any proposition at the heart of the common
 
wisdom about criminal courts, it is the assertion that defendants
 
who plead guilty are likely to receive less harsh sentences than
 
defendants with similar characteristics and charges who are
 
convicted after trial. It is this sentence differential which
 
has traditionally been seen as the engine driving the plea-

bargaining assembly line. The notion that guilty-pleaders
 
receive lighter sentences than similarly situated defendants has
 
been viewed with increased skepticism in recent research.
 
In this article, Brereton and Casper presented a case study
 
confirming the existence of sentence differentials to accomplish
 
two tasks. The first is to present evidence for the existence of
 
differentials in three court systems they have been studying and
 
to discuss issues of generalizability from these courts to other
 
courts. The second is to caution against the recent skepticism
 
about the existence of such differentials.
 
After asking judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys etc.,
 
whether or not a differential sentencing exists, many of the
 
courtroom actors strongly feel that it pays to plead guilty. In
 
this respect it could be argued that court participants tend to
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exaggerate the costs of going to trial because they fail to take
 
sufficient notice of the fact that the more serious crimes, and
 
defendants with worse records are over-represented in the trial
 
category. Further, some cases which go to trial are regarded as
 
doing so justifiably because they raise important legal
 
questions, because the defendant's guilt is in questions and so
 
on. In these cases, it is unlikely that the defendants who
 
choose trials will suffer a penalty for they are considered to
 
have wasted the courts time (Heumann, 1979). By contrast,
 
defendants whose cases are regarded as "dead bang" are much more
 
likely to receive a more severe than usual sentence if they go to
 
trial, either because the court wants to discourage others from
 
doing the same or because, as some judges and prosecutors claim,
 
such "frivolity" deserves to be punished for its own sake.
 
Brereton and Casper's study focuses on disposition patterns
 
for robbery and burglary arrests in three large California
 
jurisdictions for the period of 1974 through 1978. They analyzed
 
1759 cases from San Bernardino county, 2514 from San Francisco,
 
and 2520 from Santa Clara county. They were also able to obtain
 
records from the original charge, the type of attorney who
 
handled the case, the defendant's previous record, plus the
 
standard demographic variables of age, race, sex. A
 
straightforward comparison of the disposition patterns in each of
 
the three jurisdictions shows that a higher proportion of trial
 
defendants went to prison than did those who pled guilty. But,
 
Brereton and Casper argue that this type of comparison may be
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quite misleading because those with prior records often
 
overrepresented the trial category.
 
In concluding their article, Brereton and Casper argue that
 
sentence differentials characterize most criminal courts and
 
sentence differentials are viewed as one of functional necessity.
 
Sentence differentials are common because they are considered by
 
courtroom participants as the only way to induce sufficient
 
numbers of defendants to plead guilty. Hence, when guilty plea
 
rates are high, expect to find differential sentencing.
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THE STRUCTURE OF DISCOURSE IN MISDEMEANOR
 
PLEA BARGAINING
 
DOUGLAS W. MAYNARD
 
1984
 
In his article, Maynard examined the ways in which decisions
 
are a product of direct interaction. Maynard's article shows how
 
trial options are devalued by the system of discourse employed in
 
negotiation. Further, Maynard identified three distinct patterns
 
of negotiation and a mix of bargaining outcomes that any
 
comprehensive theory of case processing will need to address.
 
In his study, Maynard examined transcriptions of tape-

recorded plea bargaining sessions. The tape-recordings were
 
obtained at weekly "Pretrial and Settlement" conferences during
 
which defense lawyers and district attorneys assemble to discuss
 
misdemeanor cases, "bargain," and present the results of their
 
negotiations to defendants and the judge. Maynard's data or
 
method of study included fifty-two cases which ranged from theft,
 
drunk driving, battery, drinking in public, loitering, resisting
 
public officers, etc. In all, nearly ten hours of recordings
 
were obtained. Maynard's methodological perspective was that of
 
conversational analysis.
 
In his paper, Maynard treats plea bargaining as a naturally
 
occurring activity and seeks to discover formal decision making
 
patterns. Maynard argues that in plea bargaining, participants
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have ways of exhibiting and responding to positions on how the
 
case they are involved in should be handled. According to
 
Maynard, a decision is reached when the negotiating parties agree
 
on a single position. Such position is achieved by one of three
 
patterns: 1)one party takes up a position and the second agrees
 
to it; 2)both parties advance positions but one relinquishes his
 
position to agree with the other's; and 3)the parties compromise.
 
Each pattern involves (A)the presentation of ways to handle the
 
case which can be considered as "opportunities" for the
 
prosecution and defense to arrive at a mutually acceptable
 
disposition. When an opportunity is not taken up, the system
 
allows (B)the option of delaying the determination of a
 
disposition by "continuing" the case or setting it for trial.
 
Both dispositions and delay are accomplished through the use of
 
bargaining sequences.
 
In concluding his article, Maynard argues that the system
 
exerts a "pressure" for the here-and-now resolution of cases
 
independent of negotiating parties' desires and inclinations.
 
Further, Maynard argues that this system of negotiation can be
 
related to exchange approaches to plea bargaining. Maynard
 
states that the prosecution and defense can and do trade real
 
benefits by engaging in plea bargaining. However, exchange is
 
mediated by a discourse system in which routine practices, rather
 
than rational calculations are the central phenomena.
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DRIVING UNDER THE IHFLUEMCEi THE IMPACT OF LEGISLATIVE REFORM
 
ON COURT SENTENCING PRACTICES
 
RODNEY KINGSNORTH
 
MICHAEL JUNGSTEN
 
1988
 
According to the authors, the social problem of driving
 
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs (DDI) has received
 
considerable attention from social scientists in recent years.
 
For the most part, studies in this area have focused on the
 
deterrent value of the criminal law, proposals for prevention,
 
and analyses of social movements that seek to address the problem
 
through legislative reform. Furthermore, analysis of the
 
implementation of DUI legislation offers an opportunity to extend
 
the rich criminological literature that addresses the
 
modification of legislative reform by "courtroom work-groups."
 
It is important to note that in 1982, California, along with
 
26 other states, revised its vehicle code sections dealing with
 
the prosecution and sentencing of defendants charged with driving
 
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. Some of these
 
revisions include an increase in the severity of penalties, while
 
others sought to increase the certainty of application of the new
 
penalties by imposing a number of constraints upon the plea
 
bargaining process and by redefining the relationship between
 
blood alcohol concentrations (BAC) and criminal liability. Most
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of these changes followed the recommendations of the Governor's
 
Task Force on Alcohol, Drugs, and Traffic Safety.
 
The article by Kingsnorth and Jungsten is divided into two
 
basic areas. The first area deals with plea bargaining DUI
 
offenses to that of reckless driving. The authors state that
 
until 1982, plea bargaining occurred in two forms. A defendant
 
charged with DUI could have the offense reduced to reckless
 
driving in exchange for a guilty plea. Such reduction offered
 
the defendant a reduced fine, a lower probability of a jail
 
sentence, and a nonpriorable conviction. A recent study by DMV,
 
based on data from seven California counties, suggests that in
 
1981, 13 percent of all misdemeanor DUI arrests in the state
 
resulted in a charge reduction to reckless driving. The authors
 
found that 3,500 DUI cases were reduced to reckless driving
 
between 1978-1981.
 
The principal means by which the legislature sought to
 
curtail charge reduction bargaining was the enactment in 1981 of
 
the 0.10 percent "per se" law (California Vehicle Code, Section
 
23152(b)). Such law was meant to create a presumption of guilt
 
of driving under the influence. However, under said law,
 
evidence of the individuals physical performance can be used to
 
rebut a presumption of being under the influence and hampers the
 
prosecutor's ability to use BAC in conducting a prosecution. The
 
law also caused inappropriate plea bargaining for offenders with
 
BACs in excess of 0.10 percent.
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The second area which the authors discussed and which was a
 
second form of plea bargaining was that of prior conviction
 
bargaining. This process involved the practice of striking prior
 
convictions in return for the defendants guilty plea. This
 
practice was very common between 1980-1981. During this period,
 
34.6 percent of the defendants in the sample were charged with
 
prior convictions and in 86 percent of these cases, one or more
 
prior convictions were struck. However, in an attempt to
 
restrict this practice, the new legislature prohibited the
 
striking of prior convictions for purposes of sentencing in order
 
to avoid minimum jail terms, fines, or license restrictions.
 
Hence, now even first offenders were receiving jail time for
 
their offenses. Second time offenders were receiving slightly
 
stiffer sentences but, third time offenders were receiving
 
incarceration for almost double the time after the new law was
 
enacted.
 
In concluding their article, Kingsnorth and Jungsten found
 
that though the new legislation had good intentions, it was
 
grounded with false assumptions about court sentencing practices.
 
The BAG law failed to reduce the amount of trial rates and
 
increase in conviction rates that was anticipated. Further,
 
problems of court congestion have not been eased but have been
 
exacerbated by the new law.
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DETERMINATES OF CHARGE REDUCTION AND FINAL DISPOSITION
 
IN CASES OF BURGLARY AND ROBBERY
 
MALCOLM D. HOLMES
 
HOWARD C. DAUDISTEL
 
RONALD A. FARRELL
 
1987
 
According to the authors, for over half a century,
 
sociologists have expressed concern with the relationship of
 
social status to crime. In fact, despite an extensive literature
 
on differential justice, relatively few studies have examined
 
whether inequities occur in legal decisions that precede
 
sentencing. This is in fact a problem because the majority of
 
criminal cases prosecuted in the United States are disposed of
 
through guilty pleas to reduce charges. In their article, the
 
authors examined legal, status, and resource determinants of both
 
charge reductions and final dispositions in cases involving
 
burglary and robbery in two United States jurisdictions. The
 
purpose of the authors' article is to find out whether minorities
 
are disadvantaged by discriminatory processing.
 
According to the authors, most studies in the area have
 
sought to identify the effects that social characteristics of
 
alleged defendants have on decision making at the latter stages
 
of the legal process. Such research typically addresses whether
 
black, poor, and male defendants receive more severe criminal
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sentences. However, according to the authors, the findings of
 
most studies are inconclusive. The authors argue that a
 
neglected stage of legal processing involves decisions regarding
 
charge reductions, especially charge reductions against
 
nonminority defendants. The authors argue that plea bargaining
 
which involves charge reductions do not support conclusions or
 
analysis of their research because there is little to prevent
 
status influences from informally entering into them in ways that
 
formally are considered illegitimate.
 
In conducting their research, data was collected from
 
prosecutor's case files for "closed" cases. The cases were
 
prosecuted during the period of January 1976 through August of
 
1977, The vast majority of cases involved arrests for alleged
 
violations of burglary and robbery statutes. Cases that went to
 
trial were eliminated since the current research focuses on
 
guilty pleas.
 
The variable categories consist of legal, status, resource,
 
and dispositional attributes of defendants. Legal factors
 
included prior felony conviction record, number of indictments,
 
and types of indictments. Status variables were the age,
 
race/ethnicity, and employment status of defendants. Legal
 
resources were construed as representation by a private attorney
 
and pretrial release. The dispositional variables were number of
 
conviction charges, charge reduction, and final disposition
 
severity. The jurisdictions analyzed were Delaware County,
 
Pennsylvania and Pima County, Arizona.
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In concluding the article, the findings suggest that the
 
effects of the status characteristics of defendants tend to
 
operate indirectly through their influence on access to legal
 
resources. For instance, in Delaware County, black and
 
unemployed defendants were less likely to be represented by
 
private counsel; the lack of which increased the likelihood of
 
pretrial detention and a more severe final disposition. In Pima
 
County, a retention of a private attorney was rare. Employed and
 
older defendants were more likely to obtain bail; a resource that
 
ultimately advantaged them at final disposition. Race/ethnicity
 
had some unexpected effects in the two jurisdictions. In
 
Delaware, blacks received greater charge reductions than did
 
whites. In Pima County, Mexican-origin defendants received more
 
favorable final dispositions than did their counterparts. Hence,
 
status and race/ethnicity play a very important role in plea
 
bargaining.
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PRIVATE COUNSEL AND PUBLIC DEFENDERS; A LOOK AT WEAK CASES.
 
PRIOR RECORDS. AND LENIENCY IM PLEA BARGAINING
 
DEAN J. CHAMPION
 
1989
 
According to Champion, in recent years, the criminal justice
 
literature has consisted of research which focuses upon the
 
strengths and weaknesses of plea bargaining in state and federal
 
courts. Champion argues that though plea bargaining is a very
 
controversial issue, such practice accounts for over ninety
 
percent of all criminal convictions. Further, Champion argues
 
that plea bargaining may involve (1)charge bargaining, in which
 
the original charges are reduced to less serious ones; (2)count
 
bargaining, in which many charges are reduced to only one or a
 
few; and (3)sentence bargaining, in which less severe sentences
 
are imposed, perhaps including probation or little actual
 
jail/prison time to be served.
 
The purposes of Champion's research piece are threefold«
 
(1)to examine a random sample of prosecutors and determine the
 
kinds of priorities they assigned in plea bargaining to factors
 
such as prior record, seriousness of the offense, or the strength
 
of government evidence; (2)to investigate the influence of
 
socioeconomic; background of defendants on prosecutors and the
 
leniency or j harshness of terms included in plea bargain
 
agreements; and {3)to see whether representation by private
 
I
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attorney versus a public defender changes the position of a case
 
or the nature of plea bargaining terms.
 
Champion's research examined a random sample of city and
 
county prosecutors in Tennessee, Virginia, and Kentucky who
 
prosecuted criminal cases during the years 1981-1984. A random
 
sample of 260 city and county attorneys and their assistants were
 
identified and were given questionnaires by local bar association
 
representatives in 1985. The final participating sample of the
 
260 was 166. The questionnaires obtained information concerning
 
the age of prosecutors, the number of years they had been
 
prosecutors and other background information. The questionnaire
 
also had a number of questions relating to plea bargaining
 
agreements which were made amongst the prosecutors.
 
The conclusions or findings of Champion's work were that a
 
majority of prosecutors indicated that they would intensify the
 
punitive conditions of plea bargain offers when the crime or
 
crimes alleged were serious offenses (ie. crimes which involved
 
primary crimes against persons including homicide, forcible rape,
 
aggravated assault and robbery). The least influential variable
 
in this instance appeared to be the strength of government
 
evidence. Importantly, most prosecutor's stressed the importance
 
of avoiding trials and working out plea agreements with various
 
defendants.
 
As to the second purpose of Champion's research piece-­
socioeconomics of defendants, access to conviction records made
 
considerable information available concerning the socioeconomic
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 and educational background of the defendants. It was found that
 
a rather large number of cases involved guilty pleas from
 
indigent defendants who do not know or understand their rights
 
even when various attempts were made to explain the various
 
options under the law. Defendants from lower socioeconomic
 
background tend to plead guilty, take a light sentence, and such
 
defendants "lets things go as that." However, defendants from a
 
higher socioeconomic status are more informed of their rights and
 
more often take steps to see that their rights are well
 
protected.
 
In regards to the third area of Champion's paper, it was
 
found that in those cases in which the prosecution elected to
 
drop criminal charges, a majority of defendants were represented
 
by private attorneys. Hence, defendants did not fare nearly as
 
well in their punishment and in the punitive terms of plea
 
bargain agreements when they were represented by public
 
defenders. In fact, out of 28,315 cases studied, 17,912 involved
 
privately retained defense counsel and 10,403 involved public
 
defenders. Forty-eight percent of cases defended by private
 
counsel were dropped compared with on 11.3 percent of cases
 
involving public defenders. Plea bargaining leading to
 
convictions accounted for 36 percent of private counsel cases
 
versus 87.7 percent of public defender cases.
 
In concluding his article, Champion brought up an
 
interesting issue in regards to the Constitutional rights of
 
defendants who come from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and
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their treatment in the criminal justice system. He argues that
 
such mistreatment should be viewed as a violation of due process
 
based on unequal representation of the law. He argues that there
 
is a problem in the way prosecutors discriminate against
 
defendants in that lower socioeconomic status defendants receive
 
more plea bargaining. Hence, they receive more convictions and
 
stiffer sentences, too.
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 FELONY PLEA BARGAINING AND PROBATION; A GROWING JUDICIAL AND
 
PROSECUTORIAL DILEMMA
 
DEAN J. CHAMPION
 
1988
 
According to Champion, by the mid-1980s, a trend had been
 
observed because approximately ninety percent of all criminal
 
convictions were being secured through plea bargaining. Further,
 
since Brady v. U.S. (1970) there has been a general increase in
 
the use of plea bargaining in the last decade. Hence, critical
 
issues in regards to plea bargaining are the use of probation in
 
felony cases. According to Champion, when a person has committed
 
a felony, the minimum sentence that can be imposed upon
 
conviction is one year in prison. But, in Champion's opinion,
 
there are indications that convicted felons are receiving
 
probation in lieu of incarceration to an increasing degree in
 
certain jurisdictions.
 
The purpose of Champion's article was to (1)explore recent
 
trends in the use of felony probation in a random sample of
 
jurisdictions in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia, (2)compare
 
plea bargaining convictions with trial convictions concerning the
 
frequency of use of felony probation, and (3)consider the bases
 
for the differences between the states. For his research.
 
Champion sent a survey to 260 city and county prosecutors in
 
1985. The final sample of prosecutors consisted of 166
 
respondents. A random sample of city and county prosecutors
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 selected from state directories were provided questionnaires by
 
local attorneys in selected areas of Tennessee, Kentucky, and
 
Virginia. For the most part, these prosecutors were from
 
predominantly rural, small southern counties, hence, a contrast
 
with larger urban jurisdictions could be expected. Participating
 
prosecutors completed a questionnaire containing items related to
 
plea bargaining issues, prosecutorial priorities in such issues,
 
the frequency of usage of the insanity plea in criminal cases,
 
and substantial sociocultural data.
 
A content analysis of felony convictions in the 105
 
participating city/county jurisdictions was conducted for the
 
years 1970-1985. The resulting figures permitted determination
 
of the proportion of felony convictions obtained through plea
 
bargaining and trial. Beginning in 1970, for instance, 64
 
percent of convictions were obtained through plea bargaining. In
 
1971-72, about 61 percent of convictions were obtained through
 
plea bargaining. During 1974-78, about 75 percent of convictions
 
were plea bargained. From 1979 to 1985, the conviction rate
 
through plea bargaining ranged from 81 to 89 percent. The rest
 
of the convictions were obtained through trial. Though there
 
were varying reasons why plea bargaining was used rather than
 
jury trial, for one, Tennessee had enacted into law the number of
 
inmates that the prisons could hold, making it a law to release
 
inmates that the prisons had no room for. Hence, prosecutors in
 
Tennessee knew the conditions and consequences of sending more
 
people to prison.
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When a case involved trial convictions, probation was used
 
significantly less frequently. Probation was also used less
 
frequently when similar offenses were compared, when persons with
 
prior records were compared, and when comparisons were made
 
according to offense seriousness. Thus, there appeared to be a
 
greater "penalty" associated with taking a case to trial. In
 
fact, according to Champion, if an individual was convicted
 
through trial, his or her chances of securing probation were
 
lessened considerably compared with the chances of those who
 
agreed to plead guilty in an earlier plea bargain arrangement.
 
Prosecutor's agree that such is a risk a person incurs by
 
exercising fully the right to trial.
 
In concluding the article, Champion reiterated the fact that
 
now, more than ever before, cases are being plea bargained rather
 
than going to trial. And, more and more people are being given
 
probation rather than incarceration. For instance, between 1970
 
and 1985, the number of felony convictions obtained by the 166
 
prosecutors was 64,372. Of these convictions, 50,498, or
 
seventy-eight percent, were obtained through plea bargaining
 
while the rest resulted from trial verdicts.
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"PACKAGE" PLEA BARGAINING AND THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
 
BRUCE A. GREEN
 
1989
 
According to Green, in multidefendant criminal cases, the
 
prosecutor sometimes offers the defendants an "all or nothing"
 
deal, providing that one defendant will be treated leniently only
 
if all the defendants plead guilty. This practice sometimes
 
known as "package" or "contingent" plea bargaining, has been
 
upheld by courts when challenged on constitutional grounds.
 
Hence, this article undertakes a detailed examination of the
 
ethical problems raised by package plea bargaining.
 
In a series of opinions in the 1970s, the United States
 
Supreme Court has rejected a variety of constitutional challenges
 
to plea bargaining, finding that, properly administered, plea
 
bargaining can fairly benefit both the defendant and the
 
prosecution. Thus, it is permissible for a prosecutor to treat
 
the accused more leniently in exchange for a plea of guilty. At
 
the same time though, the Supreme Court explicitly withheld
 
judgment on a propriety of a prosecutor's offer during plea
 
bargaining of adverse or lenient treatment for some person other
 
than the accused.
 
While tolerating this type of plea bargaining, courts have
 
recognized that such practices place a special responsibility on
 
prosecutors to exercise good faith in making contingent plea
 
offers. However, the meaning of prosecutorial good faith is far
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from certain. This article looks at the question of
 
prosecutorial good faith when contingent plea offers involve
 
unrelated codefendants. The author argues that there is a danger
 
that one defendant may pressure another to plead guilty and
 
prosecutors should not make such plea bargaining offers for the
 
purpose of exploiting this responsibility.
 
Another area that the article discusses is the area of
 
conserving prosecutorial resources by offering "package deals."
 
The article analyzes the principal justification that has been
 
advanced in support of the practice: that a contingent plea
 
bargain is a means of conserving prosecutorial resources, but it
 
should not be used to preclude one defendant from testifying on
 
another's behalf.
 
Green also examines the meaning of good faith in cases
 
involving related defendants. In fact. Green argues that it is
 
improper to threaten to prosecute the defendant's loved one
 
absent probable cause. If there is probable cause to charge the
 
defendant's loved one, it is permissible to do so to gain
 
bargaining leverage over the defendant. Green argues that it is
 
improper for a prosecutor to use an offer of leniency to the
 
defendant's loved one to induce the defendant to plead guilty.
 
In his article, Green discusses prosecutorial "good faith"
 
when contingent plea offers involve unrelated codefendants. He
 
states that there is a danger that one defendant may pressure
 
another to plead guilty. Hence, prosecutors should not make
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 contingent plea offers for the purpose of exploiting this
 
possibility.
 
In concluding his article, Green argues that courts have
 
rejected a number of arguments and have upheld this plea
 
bargaining practice. Further, Green argues that courts have
 
hesitated to inquire into the prosecutor's motives for fashioning
 
a package plea bargain. However, a prosecutor should refrain
 
from charging or threatening to charge innocent third parties.
 
In Green's opinion, this inducement is not necessary for the
 
prosecution to achieve its legitimate aims and it encourages the
 
defendant to waive his right to trial on the basis of a factor
 
that is extraneous to his actual guilty and to the strength of
 
the government's case.
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EFFECTS OF EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE ON PLEA BARGAIN DECISIONS BY
 
PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
 
HUNTER A. MCALLISTER
 
1990
 
McAllister's article introduces and discusses an experiment
 
which was conducted to tests the effects of eyewitness evidence
 
on plea bargaining. In his experiment, two hundred eight-two
 
attorneys were mailed survey material. For each of 47 states,
 
three defense attorneys and three prosecutors were chosen.
 
California, Alaska, and Rhode Island were not included in the
 
survey. The purpose of the survey was to find out how two types
 
of eyewitness evidence (identification and nonidentification)
 
influenced plea bargaining decisions by both prosecutors and
 
defense attorneys.
 
In the article, a hypothetical case involving a robbery was
 
mailed to three prosecutors and three defense attorneys in each
 
of 47 states. The attorneys were randomly assigned to receive a
 
case in which an eyewitness claimed: (a)the defendant was the
 
criminal (identification), (b)the defendant was not the criminal
 
(nonidentification), or (c)it was not possible to tell whether
 
the defendant was the criminal (the control group). Rather than
 
focusing on juror understanding of eyewitness accuracy,
 
McAllister's research focused on how jurors cognitively handle
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the eyewitness evidence. In McAllister's opinion, the most
 
crucial issue in a case involving an eyewitness is not the
 
eyewitness accuracy itself, nor is it juror perception of
 
eyewitness accuracy; rather, it is how the potential eyewitness
 
testimony influences the plea bargaining decisions made by
 
prosecutors and defense attorneys.
 
The major issue of McAllister's paper is whether prosecutors
 
and defense attorneys would be vulnerable to the same types of
 
cognitive biases that jurors are. For example, jurors often
 
trust eyewitness identification as informative and
 
nonidentification as not informative, even though they should
 
both be of value in deciding defendant guilt. McAllister found
 
that prosecutors and defense attorneys, like jurors, underutilize
 
nonidentification testimony when making plea bargaining
 
decisions. That is, if there is no positive identification of a
 
criminal, then the chances of a plea bargaining agreement would
 
be much stronger.
 
In order to explore the impact of eyewitness testimony on
 
plea bargaining decisions, prosecutors and defense attorneys were
 
asked about three different perceptions of defendant's guilts
 
(a)a juror's, (b)their own, and (c)their opponent's. In this
 
area, it was found that the plea bargain decisions were
 
influenced by what prosecutors and defense attorneys estimated
 
the reaction of the jury or their opponent would be rather than
 
their own personal opinions of defendant guilt. Hence, results
 
showed that, for prosecutors and defense attorneys, both own
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perceptions and estimated juror perceptions were significantly
 
affected by the eyewitness manipulation.
 
In conclusion, McAllister found that both prosecutors and
 
defense attorneys showed the same underutilization of
 
nonidentification information in their plea bargain decisions as
 
shown by jurors in their judgments of defendant guilt. When
 
trying to determine the outcome of a case, prosecutors were more
 
accurate than defense attorneys. Further, McAllister mentioned
 
the importance of the need to conduct more research in the area
 
so as to be able to explore the impact of eyewitness evidence in
 
the 90 percent of plea bargaining cases that jurors never saw.
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PLEA AGREEMENTS UNDER THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
 
DONALD A. PURDY. JR.
 
JEFFREY LAWRENCE
 
1990
 
According to the authors, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
 
was enacted to correct two major flaws in the sentencing process
 
of the criminal justice system. First, defendants who had
 
committed the same crimes were receiving widely disparate
 
sentences, depending on the sentencing judge, the district within
 
which the crime was committed, and a wide variety of factors that
 
Congress deemed no longer appropriate considerations in
 
sentencing. Second, the sentences that had been imposed did not
 
accurately reflect the actual time the offender would serve. The
 
statute provided that the then-existing system of completely
 
individualized sentencing would be replaced with a guideline
 
system to be promulgated by a sentencing commission, created by
 
the Act.
 
The purpose of the commission was to direct and establish
 
federal sentencing guidelines for federal offenses to identify
 
the factors that were to be used in determining individual
 
sentences while advancing the statutory goals of the Act. The
 
commission completed its initial set of guidelines in 1987; the
 
guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987. The federal
 
sentencing guidelines structure the sentencing discretion of the
 
trial judge and change the way practitioners must look at
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sentencing consequences in general and their plea bargaining
 
discretion and options in particular.
 
The federal sentencing guidelines require that the
 
participants in the federal criminal justice system learn not
 
only the mechanics of the new sentencing guideline but also the
 
ways in which the guidelines affect their work, particularly with
 
respect to their effect on plea bargaining. Guideline sentencing
 
will affect counsel's role throughout the criminal justice
 
process, beginning with pre-indictment negotiations. Counsel
 
must be especially cognizant of the fact that the defendant's
 
actual criminal conduct and criminal history have major
 
significance under guideline sentencing. In fact, both the
 
guidelines and the Sentencing Reform Act provide that personal
 
characteristics of the defendant are far less important than
 
under pre-guideline sentencing.
 
With these guidelines, prosecutors now have a relatively
 
strict national policy governing their plea bargains that require
 
close adherence to the spirit and letter of the guidelines. The
 
acceptance of plea agreements will be affected by guideline
 
sentencing because judges and the parties will use applicable
 
guideline range as a basis for evaluating the appropriateness of
 
the plea agreement in light of the real offense conduct. Under
 
the Act, both parties are given the right to appeal a guideline
 
sentence for improper guideline application and the losing party
 
may appeal departure from the applicable guideline range. It is
 
104
 
the presiding judge who chooses the guideline range for specific
 
cases.
 
In concluding their article, the authors argue that
 
acceptance of a responsibility and providing substantial
 
assistance to authorities play crucial parts in final disposition
 
of a case. Hence, counsel may urge a reduced sentence for a
 
defendant if the defendant meets the two criteria listed. Hence,
 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 corrects the flaws which were
 
inherent in plea bargaining cases.
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THE DYNAMICS OF PLEA BARGAINING IN THREE COUNTRIES
 
MARC G. GERTZ
 
1990
 
According to Gertz, plea bargaining is an informal method of
 
compromise imposed upon the formal judicial process for the sake
 
of expediency and efficiency, and it has become the norm in the
 
American criminal justice system. Gertz's article considers the
 
extent to which plea bargaining in uniquely American and the
 
degree to which other criminal court systems will allow for
 
compromise of their formal procedures for the sake of expediency,
 
efficient, predictability, or other purposes. In his article,
 
Gertz examines the criminal court process in three countries--the
 
Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark. These
 
countries are examined to determine the extent to which plea
 
bargaining, in one form or another, takes place in these
 
countries.
 
With the Federal Republic of Germany, there are four levels
 
of West German courtst local, district, state, and national.
 
The West German court mixes professional judges with law judges
 
of assessors. In a courtroom, the presiding judge controls the
 
proceedings absolutely. With West Germany, three cities were
 
studied--Frankfurt, Kassel, and Marburg totalling 1,550,000
 
people. In his study, Gertz found that WEst Germany operated
 
using the legality principle. This principle obligates the
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police and the prosecutor, by law, to prosecute all charges for
 
which there is sufficient evidence to reasonable justice the
 
possibility of a conviction. However, it was also found that the
 
legality principle is not always utilized in practice. In fact,
 
the case for the existence of plea bargaining is buttressed by
 
the fact that under the German system, there are social official
 
procedures that give the prosecutor wide discretion to handle a
 
case without pursuing the formal process that one would expect
 
under strict observance of the legality principle. For instance,
 
Section 153A of the Code of Criminal Procedures enables
 
prosecutors to handle cases informally. With this section in
 
use, cases are suppose to be terminated if the public interest
 
would be better served by the accused paying charity, making
 
restitution, doing community services, or offering a public
 
apology. Hence, this is a form of plea bargaining.
 
With the Netherlands, there are 19 criminal district courts.
 
In each district, there are police courts where a single judge
 
hears the least serious cases and can impose a maximum sentence
 
of six months. Approximately 90 percent of cases are handled in
 
police courts, the remaining are sent to multiple-judge courts.
 
The criminal justice system in the Netherlands espouses a
 
philosophy called "the opportunity principle." Under this
 
ideology, the police and prosecutors have wide discretion in the
 
processing of cases to achieve the "best result." In other
 
words, cases may be dropped if they do not serve the ends of
 
justice, the needs of the defendant, or the desires of the public
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to proceed. The opportunity principle is used in 60 to 70
 
percent of cases.
 
In Denmark, the system begins with the city courts in 84
 
districts plus the Faroe Islands. Almost all crimes, except for
 
the most serious in which the defendant denies guilty, are dealt
 
with by the city courts. If a defendant pleads guilty, one judge
 
will hear the case. Further, if a defendant pleads not guilty,
 
then two law assessors will join the professional judge in
 
adjudicating the case. The Danish system is a compromise between
 
a legality principle and opportunity principle.
 
In fact, the Danish system involves many bargains and
 
confessions. In reality, confessions account for almost half of
 
cases. With this type of system, counsel usually advises his
 
clients to confess. Further, in Denmark, police also have the
 
ability to plea bargain. Police are permitted wide discretion in
 
notifying defendants that if they accept a certain deal, they
 
will get a fine and there would be no need to appear in court.
 
In concluding his article, Gertz argues that plea bargaining
 
occurs in one form or another in the three countries which were
 
studied. In fact, the procedures which were sued allow key
 
actors in the criminal justice system to exercise a significant
 
amount of discretion in lieu of traditional legal approaches to
 
courtroom decision making. Hence, though it may be called other
 
names, plea bargaining occurs in other countries and not just in
 
the Untied States.
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ROUGH JUSTICE
 
DAVID HEILBRONER
 
1990
 
Rough Justice was written by David Heilbroner who served
 
three years as an assistant DA in Manhattan, New York. In his
 
book, the author gave a portrayal of the New York City Criminal
 
Justice System. He also discussed many factual instances which
 
occurred during his service with the DA's office. Towards the
 
end, the author gave many suggestions on how to help the criminal
 
justice system run smoother.
 
The author divided the book into three parts. In the first
 
part he discussed the Early Case Bureau (ECAB) which was known as
 
the complaint room or the heart of the DA's office. Upon his
 
arrival to ECAB, he discussed a situation in which he noticed
 
about a dozen police officers in full uniform who were sleeping
 
on the floor. These police officers were "scattered along the
 
corridor, they looked like blue whales washed up on short," and
 
they were snoring loudly (Heilbroner, 1990, pg. 4). This
 
incident was a sign of how busy the DA's office was. In fact,
 
the majority of police officers had to wait anywhere form two to
 
I
 
four hours prior to being able to discuss their arrest with the
 
assistant DA's. 'in most cases, these officers had already worked
 
their eight hour shifts.
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While in ECAB, the author describes instances in which he is
 
interviewing witness, victims, and police officers. He mentioned
 
filling out paper work for a lady who was filing charges against
 
a man because the man kicked her in the "butt" for no apparent
 
reason. Another case involved a victim who received three knife
 
wounds from a perpetrator who was trying to steal her purse. The
 
point is that after filling out so much paperwork for each
 
individual case, the Assistant DA found it difficult to file
 
charges on each and every case because he realized that he only
 
had the arresting officer's and the victim's word to go by. For
 
instance, with out more evidence, "it seemed impossible to make
 
any judicious decision about guilt or innocence. The fact that
 
the filing DA would not see any case to the end. Assistant DA
 
Heilbroner began to discover the ECAB operated like a legal
 
assembly line. An assembly line meaning that the DA's office
 
moved cases in bulk, saving a close look at the facts for another
 
prosecutor on another day who took the case to court. The filing
 
DA copied complaints out of the ECAB manual, copied the names and
 
telephone numbers of police officers and witnesses into grids on
 
write up sheets and compressed the facts of each crime into
 
barely more than a sketch for the prosecutor who handled the
 
case. "The routine was simple: interview the cops, get the fact
 
of the case on paper, copy a complaint out of the ECAB manual,
 
and hurry on to the next arrest. The object of the assembly line
 
was to keep cases moving (Heilbroner, 1990, pg. 11).
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The majority of crimes which came through ECAB were
 
considered petty crimes. For instance, a large number of crimes
 
were farebeats--not paying the subway fare. Another crime which
 
was discussed was the crime which was called "stuff 'n' suck."
 
With this crime, there were kids who were into token-sucking.
 
That is, the perpetrators would wait for someone to insert a
 
token into the slot of the token machine and the kid would suck
 
with his mouth at the slot to get the token out. If the kid was
 
lucky, he would sell the token for $1.00.
 
At ECAB, during his first week at work for the DA;s office,
 
Heilbroner had filed more than one hundred complaints, he already
 
had a caseload of 150. There were shoplifters, farebeaters, and
 
con men. There were auto thieves breaking into cars on ill-lit
 
side streets. There were street vendors selling imitation Rolex
 
watches for $25.00 {Heilbroner, 1990, pg. 13). Further, some of
 
the arrest reports ranged from victims of spousal abuse,
 
prostitution, drug crimes, pickpocketers, shoplifting, and street
 
fighting. Hence, the crimes too, are all considered petty crimes
 
but unfortunately, all require the same amount of paper work,
 
victim/witness interviews, and police officer briefs or reports
 
of each and every crime. Unfortunately though, cases moved so
 
quick that there was really no time to seek justice. It appeared
 
as if Assistant DA's only filed paper work.
 
In an area of the book, Heilbroner discusses certain crimes
 
which were more serious than petty crimes. For instance, while
 
assigned to a case which required a hospital hearing, Heilbroner
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 was to prosecute a taxi cab driver who practically cut off a
 
customer's hand with a machete because the customer did not have
 
$9.00 for the cab ride. The cut was so severe that the man's
 
hand was merely hanging from a piece of skin which was holding it
 
intact.
 
Heilbroner gave examples of how most of the cases were
 
disposed of. For instance, deals were made by the prosecutor and
 
the defense lawyer which involved plea bargaining. In most
 
cases, both misdemeanor and felony cases were plea bargained
 
quite often. If the DA was pressed for time, then he would be
 
willing to settle for a lesser degree crime as long as the
 
defendant was punished somehow and not just set free to commit
 
another crime. An important issue of plea bargaining, according
 
the Assistant DA was that if defendants had a serious rap sheet
 
{prior arrest and conviction record), then the likelihood of plea
 
bargaining was very limited. For those defendants who did have a
 
rap sheet, their punishment usually involved probation with some
 
type of incarceration. In a section of the book, the author gave
 
a good example of defendant's "copping out" pleas almost
 
instantaneously. Defendants were plea bargaining because they
 
did not want to do "hard time" if they did not "cop out." In a
 
sense, defendants were forced into "copping out" without the
 
opportunity of a trial. Though these defendants were perfectly
 
welcome to take their case to trial, they did not dare because
 
the judge and DA would strive for almost double or harsher
 
sentences if the cases went to trial. According to Heilbroner,
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plea bargaining was somehow illegal and immoral and possibly
 
causing the city's crime problem. Plea bargaining allowed
 
criminals to escape just punishment, and return recidivists to
 
the streets all that more quickly. But could plea bargaining be
 
removed?
 
Heilbroner discussed a voir dire process in which attorneys
 
look for the best person/people to sin in on a jury. In
 
Heilbroner's words "voir dires are used to keep nuts off the jury
 
panel" (Heilbroner, pg. 70). For most cases, a good jury would
 
be made of middle-class, middle-aged people, the types who have
 
held the same job for a number of years, and preferably, those
 
who have children. Jury members should be no/nonsense people who
 
don't mind following orders and have a sake in the community
 
(Heilbroner, 1990, pg 79). Though it may be hard, jury member
 
should be people who have not been victimized for the same type
 
of crime as the one they are going to hear. Such people will
 
certainly be biased.
 
In the second part of the book, titled MADMEN AND FUGITIVES,
 
the author was assigned to the Special Project Bureau. Special
 
Project deals with two area of prosecution rarely encountered in
 
criminal courts insanity and extradition cases. With insanity
 
cases, the M'Naughten Rule was formulated way back in 1843. Such
 
rule reasoned that an accused should not be held responsible for
 
his crimes if "a disease of the mind" prevents him from knowing
 
"the nature and quality of his acts" or distinguishing "right
 
from wrong" (Heilbroner, 1990, pg. 119). While assigned to the
 
113
 
Special Project Bureau, Heilbroner was sent to Kirby Forensic
 
Psychiatric Center to prosecute cases for the state. All those
 
who were incarcerated at Kirby Center were convicted for
 
committing extremely violent, perverse crimes, have entered
 
insanity pleas, and now spend their days inside closely monitored
 
wards awaiting the moment when a judge will find the
 
"nondangerous". For instance, some of the crimes which people
 
were incarcerated for arei a man was accused of literally
 
cutting up young boys. There was a case of a mother and daughter
 
who cold-bloodily murdered the grandparents because of some
 
spiritual belief and because of "little voices" telling them to
 
do so. There was a Carolyn Appelsammy who cut up her two kids
 
and took a bath in their blood. With this case, there was also
 
some evidence of anthropophagy--drinking their blood or eating
 
their flesh (Heilbroner, pg. 129). Ms. Appelsammy had been in
 
various hospitals for a least ten years. Was she fit to be
 
released to a nonsecurity facility? The judge of the case
 
decided against her release to a minimum security facility.
 
Then, there was the case of Plutowskin who cold-bloodily murdered
 
a stranger who asked to have sex with him. After eight years.
 
the court decided that some violent tendencies still remained and
 
decided that the defendant/murderer was unfit to be classified as
 
"nondangerous" due to some violent outbursts against the
 
hospital staff. Throughout these cases, Heilbroner wondered if
 
these defendants were really medically insane or had they just
 
beaten the system?
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In the third part of the book titled FELONS, the author
 
discussed felony cases. The New York Penal Code defines a felony
 
as any offense punished by more than one year in prison or a one
 
thousand dollar fine. As distinguished from petty crimes,
 
assault meant a stab in the back rather than a punch in the nose
 
or a kick in the "butt"; larceny meant forging fifty thousand
 
dollars of checks rather than stealing pantyhose. Victims of
 
these crimes suffered serious physical, emotional, or financial
 
injury. Robbery victims were terrified of riding alone in
 
elevators and assault victims went to plastic surgeons. All
 
these victims wanted to see just punishment meted out.
 
Unfortunately, these victims later began to feel as if they were
 
burned twice; once by the defendant and once by the system
 
because they were treated very harshly.
 
In felony cases the author discusses an incident were a
 
lawyer was mugged and beaten by a group of juveniles. With
 
felony cases, there was much more work for the assistant OA's to
 
do. They had to investigate more extensively the facts of each
 
crime from robberies, physical abuses, rapes, and murders. At
 
the felony level, Assistant DA's view every defendant as being
 
crooks, "no one is innocent" (Heilbroner, 1990, 213). For
 
instance, the author discussed a case where a man's credit cards
 
were found on a defendant that was being charged with a robbery
 
crime. Since the owner never reported the cards stolen, it was
 
later found through investigation that the owner too, was selling
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drugs and letting the robbery defendant use the cards to purchase
 
the drugs with.
 
In concluding his book, the author made many suggestions on
 
how to help the criminal justice system run smoothly and
 
efficiently. First of all, DA's should be encouraged to dismiss
 
more of the marginal misdemeanor cases so that serious matters
 
can receive the attention they deserve. Legalizing prostitution
 
and marijuana, even though politically unpopular, would also help
 
eliminate thousands more petty cases each year; cases that
 
neither judges nor prosecutors take very seriously in any event.
 
The artificial misdemeanor-felony distinctions should be
 
reformed. For instance, one can punch fifty people in the face,
 
loosening teeth, blackening eyes, and yet, because the crimes are
 
misdemeanors, the perpetrator cannot receive more than one year
 
for each assault. In contrast, a petty thief who steals purses
 
and credit cards faces a minimum of fifteen to twenty-five years
 
and a maximum of life for his third offense. Further, police
 
officers should be fined every time they illegally search,
 
question, or arrest a defendant. Similarly, lawyers and judges
 
should be disciplined for the misrepresentations and countless
 
undue delays that jam the wheels of justice. Thus, the viewpoint
 
of the author is that the New York Criminal Justice System does
 
not meet its potential to seek justice for every and all crimes
 
due to the quantity of crimes and punishments which need to be
 
sought. Of course, there are many ares which need to be changed
 
116
 
in the criminal justice system, but even if such areas were
 
changed, would such changes help reduce crime?
 
In an area of his book, Heilbroner discusses the fact that
 
victims were "burned" twice. In all reality, most if not all
 
criminal justice literature stress the fact that victims are the
 
unfortunate parties, not necessarily because they have been
 
harmed by the defendants but because in many instances, there is
 
not much that the criminal justice system can do for victims
 
other than counsel and seek restitution on their behalf.
 
According to the author, in all reality, the phrase "victims are
 
the forgotten people in the criminal justice system, seems to be
 
true. The criminal justice system seems to grant the defendants
 
more right and thus, better treatment to those who commit crime
 
rather than those who have crime committed upon them against
 
their will.
 
ROUGH JUSTICE gives a portrayal of any criminal justice
 
system, be it New York or California. In fact, most criminal
 
justice system literature discuss the problems of the system such
 
as the backlogging of courts with the big quantity of cases which
 
must be processed through them. The over-crowdedness of jails
 
and prisons does not leave any hopes for rehabilitation which
 
used to be the main concern of any correctional facility. In
 
fact, now the prison systems are considered merely a punishment
 
and warehousing facility according to Heilbroner.
 
The author discusses many of the problems which occur in the
 
New York Criminal Justice System. But the problems occur in
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every other state as well. Most all law enforcement, courts, and
 
correction facilities are very much understaffed according to
 
most of the current literature. Thus, the author's book serves
 
to portray the realities of any and all criminal justice systems.
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CONCLUSION
 
Though the primary goal of this analysis was to find ways to
 
help the criminal justice system operate more effectively and
 
efficiently in the area of plea bargaining, a complete change in
 
plea bargaining would seem to be disastrous. The fact that the
 
courtroom actors are not willing to change makes any changes with
 
plea bargaining that much more difficult. In addition, criminal
 
justice budgets may not allow changes in the near future.
 
One of the goals of this analysis was to find a way in
 
which the criminal justice system could operate without plea
 
bargaining, but, after review, abolishing plea bargaining in it's
 
entirety would, in fact, be a nightmare for those who work in the
 
system. Though abolishing plea bargaining, on its face, sounds
 
good, imagine what that would do to the caseload of the criminal
 
justice cases which need attention. Each and every defendant
 
would have a full scale trial with a long wait in jail before the
 
case would be considered. With the long jail wait, defendants
 
would feel guilty even before their case gets to the court
 
docket.
 
Since plea bargaining cannot be abolished, a restructuring
 
of the process should strongly be considered, however. Finding a
 
way to treat each and every defendant as equal should be adopted.
 
That is, defendants who commit certain crimes should have to do a
 
certain amount of time. Sentences should be fixed so that
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discrimination would not occur with the meting out of punishment.
 
Upperworld and underworld crimes should be treated alike, for
 
example. Plea bargaining or sentencing guidelines should be used
 
to eliminate the disparate sentencing which occurs.
 
Additionally, judges could receive more training in sentencing.
 
Plea bargaining practices should be reformed in ways that would
 
allow the general public to have a better understanding of the
 
process.
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